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I. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is the driving force of the world economy.  The agent of 
innovation is small and medium-sized enterprise1 (“SME”), especially the venture 
                                                          
* Member of the New York Bar; Research Fellow at the Korea Securities Research Institute (KSRI). 
The author is deeply grateful to Professors J. William Hicks, Hannah L. Buxbaum, and Donna M. Nagy 
at IU Maurer School of Law-Bloomington for their encouragement. This article does not reflect the 
views of the KSRI and the professors. 
1 “In general, an SME is defined to be an enterprise employing less than 300 personnel and of 
varying size, sector and type…As the main component of the Korean economy, SMEs represent 99.8% 
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business. 2   The venture business 3 can hardly grow independently, even if 
sufficiently funded.  It requires management and marketing assistance as well as 
other environmental supports.  The interrelationship and interaction among market 
players and their surroundings make the whole venture capital 4  industry an 
                                                          
of the entire enterprises (3 million SMEs), and 86.5% of the total employment (10.41 million 
employees).” “Resources” section of BizMatchKorea.com, http://www.bizmatchkorea.com/aboutus/korea_ 
smes.jsp (last visited Feb 2, 2009).  
2 Notable studies have shown that the monopoly power of a big company is not positively related to 
innovation but rather impedes innovation.  Stefan Duffner, Principal-Agent Problems in Venture 
Capital Finance, at 8 (WWZ/Dep’t of Fin., Working Paper No. 11/03, 2003) (citing “Frisch, A. J. 
(1993): Unternehmensgrösse Und Innovation: Die Schumpeterianische Diskussion Und Ihre 
Alternativen, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag[,]” 50-130), available at http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/ 
finance/publications/papers/PrincAgent.pdf.   
Modern research supports the notion that large established firms have great 
difficulty managing innovations that fall outside of their previous experience, 
including architectural innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990), competency-
destroying innovations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and disruptive 
technology that changes the basis for competition in an industry (Christensen, 
1997).  Established firms may partially overcome these limitations through 
ambidextrous organizational structures (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997), radical 
innovation hubs (Leifer et al, 2000), and corporate venturing programs that 
emulate venture capital (Chesbrough, 2000). 
John Callahan & Steven Muegge, Venture Capital’s Role in Innovation: Issues, Research and 
Stakeholder Interests, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INNOVATION 641, 642 (Larisa V. 
Shavinina ed., 2003); see also Melissa Goodwin, Firm Size and R&D; Testing the Schumpeterian 
Hypothesis, UAUJE, 1998, at 1, 6 , available at www.econ.ilstu.edu/uauje/PDF's/issue1998/ 
Schumpeterian_Hypothesis.pdf (arguing that “the credibility of the Schumpeterian hypothesis is 
weakened because of the lack of supporting evidence”). 
Many studies support the argument that small start-up companies, especially venture start-ups, are 
the main engine for the future economic development of a country.  See Duffner, supra note 2, at 9 
(stating that “empirical studies concerning the effects of the organizational conservatism and indolence 
suggest that small firms are typically the source for major innovations. . .”); ROGER WYSE, What the 
Public Sector Should Know about Venture Capital, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN 
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1281, 1281 (Krattiger 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/ch13/ipHandbook-
Ch%2013%2003%20Wyse%20Venture%20Capital-A%20Primer.pdf (stating that “[a] growing amount 
of [biotechnology commercialization] is done by small companies”); GLOBAL INSIGHT, VENTURE 
IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. 
ECONOMY 4 (4th ed., 2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/NVCA_VentureCapital07-2nd.pdf 
(claiming that “[t]he nation’s venture capital industry plays a paramount role in nourishing the U.S. 
economy by bringing innovative concepts and business models to life”). 
Let alone the academic studies, we know that most industry leading big companies such as 
Microsoft, FedEx, and Starbucks started as innovative small businesses. 
3 For the definition of venture business, see infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying texts. 
4 Venture capital is “high-risk capital that is invested in early-stage companies.”  Wyse, supra note 
2, at 1282.  Venture capital investment “is not a loan; it is an equity investment, with the investor 
owning shares of the company.” Id.  In this respect, “[v]enture capital can be defined as equity or 
equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial 
intermediary who is typically actively as a director, an advisor, or even a manager of the firm.”  Samuel 
Kortum & Josh Lerner, Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation?, 1 n.1 (NBER Working Paper No. 
W6846, 1998), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers2/9899/99-
078.pdf. 
For the explanation of the characteristics of venture capital, see ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE 
CAPITAL AND FINANCE OF INNOVATION 3 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_ 
id=929145. 
Venture capital investment takes the legal form of private placement. William Bratton, Venture 
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 898 (2002). 
“There is accordingly no public database respecting their financial terms and contracting structures. 
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ecosystem.5  The effective functioning of the venture capital ecosystem is a key 
element to successful promotion for venture businesses.  A bank-centered financial 
system cannot generate the cost-effective mechanisms of venture capital 
investment.6  The success of a venture business ecosystem lies in incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms based on private ordering7 and a virtuous cycle of venture 
capital facilitated by active stock markets. 
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korean venture businesses have been 
recognized as an alternative driving force for the nation’s economic growth.8  Due 
to the government’s supportive policies, the Korean venture industry grew rapidly 
in quantity and size. 9   However, it is doubtful that the governmental policy 
achieved the substantial development of the venture industry.10  The Korean policy 
to promote venture businesses has mainly consisted of direct support and 
regulation based on the venture certification system.  Under the system, the act and 
rules artificially define venture business and provide capital, tax benefits, and other 
preferential regulatory treatments to the government-certified venture enterprises.11  
                                                          
Actors in the industry, moreover, can be expected to take a proprietary view respecting their 
transactions’ documentation.”  Id. 
5 See infra Chapter IV. Subchapter A. Venture Capital Market System as an Ecosystem. 
6 See Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 246 (1998), available at http://www.sciencedirect. 
com/science/article/B6VBX-35X82RY-2/2/a203fc03bb817d3bd30c161ed08feb40 (arguing that the 
implicit mechanisms of venture capital contract “cannot readily be duplicated in a bank-centered capital 
market”). 
7 “Professor Fuller has defined private ordering as law that parties bring into existence by 
agreement.” Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlements: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 659 n.168 (2007) (emphasis changed) (citing Robert H. Mnookin 
& Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 
950 n.1 (1979)); see also Ronald L. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003) (arguing “the keystone of the U.S. venture 
capital market is private ordering - the contracting structure that developed to manage the extreme 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-stage, high-
technology financing”). 
8 The Asian financial crisis was a good opportunity in disguise for the Korean economy to be 
restructured.  “[A]fter the financial crisis hit Korea in 1997, Korea had swiftly adjusted itself to the 
Anglo-Saxon economic model based on open market economy, the government’s non-intervention 
policy, maximization of consumer rights and promotion of shareholder capitalism”  Chaebol Attack 
Anglo-Saxon Economic Model, THE KOREA TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004.   “[T]he government began to realise 
that they could no longer depend on large multinational firms to fuel the economy, leading them to shift 
emphasis from big business to small and medium enterprises.”  Gary Gregory et al., Korean SMEs in 
the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Strategies, Constraints, and Performance in a Global Economy, 13 
(Univ. of Wollongong, Dept. of Econ., Working Paper 02-12, 2002), available at http://www.uow. 
edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@commerce/@econ/documents/doc/uow012131.pdf.  Especially, 
“[f]acing the . . . erosion of competitive advantage in mature-technology products, the Korean 
government has attempted to encourage the private sector to develope emergent-technology products.”  
Jangwoo Lee, Challenges of Korean Technology-Based Ventures and Governmental Policies in the 
Emergent-Technology Sector, 20 TECHNOVATION 489, (2000), available at http://www.venture.co.kr/ 
article/technovation2000.pdf. 
9 The venture capital market in Korea “start[ed] from a negligible base in the early 1990s and 
almost tripl[ed] between 1998 and 2001.”  Günseli Baygan, Venture Capital Policies in Korea, at 5 
(OECD Science, Tech. and Indus. Working Papers 2003/2, 2003), available at 
http://www.sourceoecd.org/10.1787/248000716362; see also infra notes 227, 243 and accompanying 
texts. 
10 See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying texts. 
11 See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying texts. 
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Those government-driven policy measures are contradictory to the goal of the 
Korean venture capital policy: “the expansion of infrastructure for private sector 
leading venture investment in order to establish a market-based venture 
ecosystem.”12  The government’s direct involvement in the private sector of the 
venture capital market seriously impaired the incentive and monitoring mechanism 
among the market players13  and checked the spontaneous development of the 
Korean venture business ecosystem.14 
The government-driven policy increased the negative impact of the burst of 
the KOSDAQ15 bubble16 in 2000 and brought about market players’ moral hazard 
problems17 by causing the money game and stock price manipulation.18  As shown 
                                                          
12 Small and Medium Business Administration, “⻺㻮䃦䞒䌞 ㍶㰚䢪 ⹿㞞” [Plan for the 
Advancement of Venture Capital], Briefing for Reporters, 2006, p. 1 (translated from Korean to 
English), available at http://www.smba.go.kr/portal/main.board.BoardServlet?id=01AA&seq=1799& 
cmd=view&func=0. 
13 See Christopher Gulinello, Engineering a Venture Capital Market and the Effects of Government 
Control on Private Ordering: Lessons from the Taiwan Experience, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 845, 
847 (2005) (contending that “[g]overnment involvement will be lethal to [the] engineering efforts if it 
operates to remove the investors’ incentives to select and monitor investments”). 
14 See Corporations, Venture Firms Making Efforts to Enhance Ethical Standards, THE KOREA 
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2002 (reporting that “[s]ome venture firm CEOs, such as Ahn Chul-soo, head of 
Ahnlab, a Kosdaq-registered firm specializing in antidotes for computer viruses, criticized the excessive 
fund support from the government on the grounds it undermines venture companies’ spontaneity”), 
available at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/.    
15 ‘KOSDAQ’ stands for Korea Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation. 
The similarity of the name to ‘Nasdaq,’ which is an acronym for National 
Securities Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation, gives the 
impression that the KOSDAQ stock market is similar to the Nasdaq market. This 
impression is both true and false. . . the KOSDAQ differs from the Nasdaq in that 
the government plays a much greater role.   
Inseok Shin, Evolution of the KOSDAQ Stock Market: Evaluation and Policy Issues, 2 (AT10 Research 
Conference, the Tokyo Club Foundation for Global Studies, 7-8 March 2002), available at 
http://www.tcf.or.jp/data/20020307-08_Inseok_Shin.pdf. 
“After amending Article 172 of the Securities and Exchange Act in 1996, the KOSDAQ stock 
market was created and managed by several separate organizations.”  THE KOSDAQ MARKET, KOSDAQ 
FACTBOOK 2003 5 (2004), available at http://km.krx.co.kr. 
Currently, the KOSDAQ market has been operated by KRX since KSM, KOSDAQ, and the 
Korea Futures Exchange were consolidated into KRX.  KSDA, SECURITIES MARKET IN KOREA 59 
(2007), available at http://www.ksda.or.kr/UPLOADFILES/Securities%20Market%20in%20Korea%20 
2007%20(KSDA).pdf. 
16 See Young-sam Cho, Report Advises Government to Reduce Support for Start-Ups to Avoid 
‘Bubble’, THE KOREA HERALD, April 25, 2000 (reporting the argument that “excessive subsidization of 
the venture industry might contribute to the development of a venture bubble”). 
17 See KDI Calls for Cut in Government Investment in Venture Firms, THE KOREA HERALD, July 
28, 2000 (reporting the argument that “expanded government investment in venture firms may not only 
drive out private investments but also lead to moral hazard problems”); Young-sam Cho, Panel of 
Experts Portray Gloomy Outlook for Venture Industry, THE KOREA HERALD, Oct. 30, 2000 (reporting 
the argument that “the government’s measures to boost the Kosdaq by easing conditions for ventures 
companies to get registered posed large moral hazard problems, increasing the risk to investors”).  
18 In 2000, the Korean Development Institute (KDI), “recommended that the government decrease 
its level of support for venture start-ups, given the risks for a venture bubble and moral hazards to 
investors.”  Cho, supra note 16 (emphases changed); see also Venture Moral Hazards (1): The Money 
Game, DIGITAL CHOSUNILBO (English Edition), Dec. 1, 2000, available at http://english.chosun.com/ 
w21data/html/news/200011/200011300349.html (last visited June 8, 2008); Venture Moral Hazards 
(2): Stock Manipulation, DIGITAL CHOSUNILBO (English Edition), Dec. 5, 2000, available at 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200012/200012040469.html. 
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in Figure 1, the burst of the Information-Technology (IT) bubble hit the KOSDAQ 
market harder than the NASDAQ.   
Figure 1: Comparison of Monthly Charts Referring to Declining Rates of 
NASDAQ and KOSDAQ Composite Indices 
Created with Korea Investment & Securities Company’s Home Trade System by Kab Lae Kim (2008). 
This study comprehensively analyzes both the implicit contract theory and 
the venture capital cycle theory.  Using the U.S. venture capital theories as the 
framework, this study diagnoses the fundamental problem of the Korean venture 
policy.  Ultimately, this study suggests a market-friendly venture promotion policy 
based on private ordering among market players and a virtuous cycle of venture 
capital supported by active IPO markets. 
II. OVERVIEW OF VENTURE BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL 
A. The Definition of Venture Business 
The term “venture business” is commonly used, but is not uniformly 
defined. 19   A venture business has the following unique business attributes: 
                                                          
19 Venture business is defined slight differently in each part of the world. For example, 
United States use the terms High Technology Small Firm (HTSF) or New 
Technology Based Firm (NTBF) as venture business while Japan legally 
recognizes venture business as firms that invest more than 3% of total sales in 
Research and Development (R&D).   
Tae Kyung Sung et al., Study on Characteristics of Technology Transfer in Venture Business, 34th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS-34)-Volume 8, at *2 (2001) 
(citation omitted), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/login.jsp?url=/iel5/7255/20032/ 
00927141.pdf?arnumber=927141.  The definition of venture business differs according to the economic 
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innovative ideas or technologies, venture entrepreneurs,20 small scale without large 
capital outlay, high growth and high risk, and segment or niche marketing.  These 
attributes are opposite to those of a traditional large enterprise: big capital, 
experienced entrepreneurs, large scale, stable return and low risk, and mass 
marketing.  Based on these attributes, a “venture business” can be defined as a 
knowledge or technology-based new small enterprise which has the potential to 
open up a new market with high risk and high return.21  
 Generally, a venture business is known as a high-tech intensive business 
such as Microsoft or Google.  However, the high-technology is not the decisive 
factor in the definition of venture business.  As shown in the cases of FedEx and 
McDonalds, 22  venture capitalists 23  (“VCs”) often invest in traditional business 
firms if the companies are considered likely to capture a new market24 and the 
business risks come with high returns.25  The deciding factors in the definition of 
                                                          
system.  
[T]he European definition of venture capital is broader than the American 
definition.” Black & Gilson, supra note 2, at 251. “The European Venture 
Capital Association defines ‘venture capital’ to include leveraged buyouts and 
buyins, and replacement of a firm’s existing financing.  In contrast, leveraged 
buyout firms in the United States are a distinct industry from venture capital 
firms; venture capital is also distinct from non-venture private equity financing. 
Id. at 267.  See also Duffner, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that “[m]any authors use terms inconsistently or 
they set different terms to be equal”). 
20 The managerial ability of entrepreneurs is essential for the success of the venture start-up.  
“Indeed, research has shown that venture capitalists rate the quality of the start-up company’s 
management as the single most important consideration in determining whether to support the 
company.”  Anderson, infra note 38, at 5. 
21 Historically, “[t]he term ‘venture business’ first surfaced in Japan in the 1960s . . . .” Sunil Mani 
& Anthony Bartzokas, Institutional Support for Investment in New Technologies: the Role of Venture 
Capital Institutions in Developing Countries, 19 n.5 (Discussion Paper Series 2002-4, 2002), available 
at http://www.intech.unu.edu/publications/discussion-papers/2002-4.pdf. 
In Korea, the term “venture business” has become popular since the Act on Special Measures for 
the Promotion of Venture Businesses was established in 1997. The Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, “⻺㻮₆㠛 10 ⎚, ㎇ὒ㢖 ὒ㩲” [Ten Years of Venture Businesses, Achievements and 
Problems], 2007, p. 1, available at http://www.korcham.net/FileWebEDMS/target/20070810004_1.pdf; 
see Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses (“Venture Promotion Act”), Act 
No. 9071 (2008). 
22 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 5-6 (1999). 
23 A venture capitalist is an investor who “search[es] for significantly above-average 
investment returns through equity ownership and involvement in dynamic 
(typically start-up and emerging) young companies believed to have experienced 
management and proprietary or innovative products or services useful in rapidly 
growing markets.”  As this definition makes clear, the venture capitalist is more 
than an investor; rather, he is an owner and participant in the management of the 
selected company.  
Anderson, infra note 38, at 4 (citing Daniel H. Case III, An Overview of Venture Capital, in START-UP 
COMPANIES: PLANNING, FINANCING, AND OPERATION THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS § 6.01[1] (1985)). 
Venture capitalists have backed many leading high-technology companies including Sun 
Microsystems, Netscape, Cisco Systems, Apple Computer, and Genentech.  Paul A. Gompers & Joshua 
Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising? (1999) (Working Paper, Harvard Univ.), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=57935. 
24 “[W]hether high or low tech, the traditional venture capitalist thrives when the companies in 
which he invests have an advantage over potential competition in a defined segment of the market, 
often referred to as a niche.”  BARTLETT, supra note 22, at 6 (emphasis changed). 
25 Cf. “Therefore, it is not a specific industry that creates a successful venture capital project. 
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venture business are innovation, venture entrepreneurs, lack of track record and 
collateral, and a high risk26 and high return.27 
In the U.S., the definition of venture business is not of much consequence in 
either academic or practical sense.28  A “venture capital backed company” is the 
more popular and important term in the U.S. venture business industry.29  It is 
because the U.S. venture industry has been led by “private equity”30 investors 
based on the principle of free market economy.31  In Korea, the venture industry 
has been driven by government policies.  As a prerequisite to the execution of a 
venture promotion policy, the statutory definition of venture business is practically 
important. 
In Korea, the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture 
Businesses32  (“Venture Promotion Act”) statutorily defines a venture business.  
Under Article 2-2 of the Act, a venture business firm is defined as an SME which 
is i) a venture capital-backed company, ii) business with superior technologies by 
SMBA, or iii) company guaranteed by a technology credit guarantee fund or 
obtaining loans from government-designated institutions.33  To receive the benefits 
under the Venture Promotion Act, a venture business must fall within the statutory 
definition of venture business as well as meet the procedural requirement of 
obtaining a certificate of venture business under the Act.34 
                                                          
Rather, it is the functional nature of the venture capital contracting mechanism and the alignment of the 
economic incentives that underlie whether the venture capital contract will be successful.”  Haksoo Ko 
& Hyun Young Shin, Venture Capital in Korea? Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, 
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 457, 473 (1999). 
26 The high risk in connection with venture capital investment is closely related to other 
characteristics of venture business: innovation and venture entrepreneurs.  It is hard to evaluate the 
technical feasibility and marketability of the innovation or to observe the entrepreneurs’ competence 
and honesty.  See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A 
Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 54-55 (2002). 
27 See Duffner, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that “[t]ypical criteria that distinguish young 
companies from more mature companies are their small size, missing past, need for equity, negative 
cash flows, high risks and strong focus on the founder (see Weimerskirch (1999), pp. 6-8)”). 
28 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 471 (stating that “[t]here is no statutory definition of a venture 
capital company in the United States”). 
29 See generally GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 2. 
30 “Private equity . . . refers to any type of equity investment in an asset in which the equity is not 
freely tradable on a public stock market.”  Ho-jin Lee, The Impact of Private Equity Funds on the 
Korean M&A Market, KOREA’S ECONOMY 2007, Feb. 2007, at 24, available at http://www.keia.com/ 
Publications/KoreasEconomy/2007/07Ho-Jin.pdf.  “Private equity is a broad category that includes 
leveraged buyout funds, venture funds, real estate funds and other funds that hold illiquid investments, 
such as many distressed debt, high yield and mezzanine funds.”  Stephanie R. Breslow & Phyllis A. 
Schwartz, Recent Trends in Private Equity Funds, in SEVENTH ANNUAL PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM 
(2006). 
31 “The American venture capital model usually is centered around a private venture capital firm. 
However, several options exist, including firms and funds established under the Small Business 
Investment Act which was passed in 1958. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1988).”  Anderson, infra note 38, at 5 n.22 
(citing Silvia B. Sagari & Gabriela Guidotti, Venture Capital: The Lessons from the Developed World 
for the Developing Markets, FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS No. 2, at 4 (1992)). 
32 The “Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses” is also called “Special 
Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies.”  See Ko & Shin, supra note 25. 
33 For the detailed requirements to be a “venture business,” see Venture Promotion Act § 2-2. 
34 For details of the procedure for the certificate of venture business, see Venture Promotion Act  
§ 25. 
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The legislative definition has a dilemma between rigid and flexible 
definitions of venture business.  Venture industries are quickly changing in 
response to various consumer demands and rapid technical developments.35  The 
statutory definition is hard to be updated to cover newly-opening venture 
businesses.  To keep the definition flexible, the Act broadly and abstractly defines 
venture business and delegates discretion to public officers in providing the 
detailed standards and certifying whether an SME falls within the definition of 
venture business.36  However, administrative discretion can cause many problems 
relating to incentives, specialty, and the morality of public officers.  The 
government’s direct supports and regulations based on the bureaucratic definition 
of venture business widely and deeply influence the Korean venture industry.  So 
the problems caused by the artificial definition have a substantial negative impact 
on the whole venture industry in Korea.   
The governmental definition of venture business enables the SMEs that fall 
within the artificial definition to receive preferential support without passing the 
screening of financial intermediaries.  Consequently, incompetent SMEs are 
allowed to survive in the market, causing the waste of national budget spending 
and inefficient distribution of economic resources.37   The direct governmental 
involvement in and support for venture businesses are based on the government’s 
misunderstanding of the characteristics of the whole venture business ecosystem.  
As for the venture promotion policy, understanding characteristics of venture 
capital and its interaction with venture business is of greater consequence than 
defining venture business.38 
B. Venture Capital and Staged Financing 
Generally, the business assets of a venture start-up company are only its’ 
innovative technology and/or its’ business model.  Lack of track records in the 
market and traditional assets that can be used for collateral makes it hard for a 
venture business to be financed by risk averse debt-financing sources such as 
banks. 39   Also, in the matter of financing a venture business, banks cannot 
                                                          
35 Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 471 (arguing that “a specific and descriptive definition . . . increases 
the risk of distorting the alignment of economic incentives necessary for successful venture capital 
contracting”). 
36 The Venture Promotion Act delegates the authority to provide detailed requirements for the 
definition of venture business to the Presidential Decree.  Venture Promotion Act § 2-2; Enforcement 
Decree of Venture Promotion Act § 2-3 (delegating the authority to provide more detailed requirements 
for the definition of venture business to Enforcement Rule of Venture Promotion Act and Public 
Notification of the Administrator of Small and Medium Business Administration). 
37 Jong Soo Choi & Sung Eun Kim,  “⻺㻮₆㠛㥷㎇㠦 ὖ䞲 䔏⼚㫆䂮⻫㦮 ⶎ㩲㩦㠦 ὖ䞲 㡆ῂ” 
[A Research on the Problems in the Special Law for Upbringing the Venture business], Journal of 
Economics Volume 10, Number 2, Korea Economic and Business Association, 2001, p. 196. 
38 Cf. Bentley J. Anderson, Venture Capital and Securities Market Development in Malaysia: The 
Search for a Functioning Exit Mechanism, 12 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1, 4 (1993) (arguing that “the best way to 
provide a working definition of venture capital is to define what a venture capitalist does”). 
39 Generally, banks are risk averse.  “[T]hey tend to avoid extending loans to companies whose 
ability to stay solvent and thus pay back their loans remains unproven.”  David Rosenberg, Venture 
Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 364 
(2002); see also Richard H. Rowe, The Registered Offering, in FINANCIAL PROJECT FUNDAMENTALS: A 
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS § 1:2.1 (2006) (stating that “[b]anks may be unwilling or unable to lend to risky, 
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efficiently overcome the following obstacles caused by the characteristics of a 
venture business: “high uncertainty,” “information asymmetry,” “intangible soft 
assets,” and “sensitivity to volatile market conditions.” 40   To develop, 
commercialize, and market innovative ideas or technologies, venture businesses 
need a specialized form of financing, a venture capital financing, where VCs are 
willing and able to take and manage the intrinsic risks of the venture business.41  
As well as financial services, venture capital provides “management assistance,” 
“intensive monitoring,” and intermediary service as a “reputational capital”42 to a 
venture business.  Those non-financial services reduce the risks associated with 
venture capital investment through contractual mechanisms. 43   The economic 
                                                          
start-up businesses or to lend additional funds to a company with an insufficient equity base”), 
available at WESTLAW, PLIREF-FINP § 1:2.1.  Therefore, “[f]inancing is the core problem of young 
growth companies (see Brettel/Jaugey/Rost (2000), pp. 47-55) slowing their ability to innovate; it can 
even be called the entrepreneur’s Achilles Heel (Timmons (1999), p. 411).”  Duffner, supra note 2, at 
12 (emphasis changed). 
40  Callahan & Muegge, supra note 2, at 642 (quoting Gompers and Lerner’s theory). 
High uncertainty is a fundamental trait of innovation that no amount of study or 
due diligence can entirely eliminate.  The future is not only unknown, it is 
unknowable (Christensen, 1997).  Information asymmetry refers to the large 
information gaps possible between innovators and investors.  Because of their 
particular specialized expertise, innovators are likely to have a superior 
understanding of their innovation, while investors are likely to have a superior 
understanding of financing.  Intangible soft assets include patents and 
trademarks, human capital, and future opportunities.  The real value of these 
assets is difficult to measure; they may have great value to a particular owner, but 
negligible value to others.  The value and liquidity of innovative firms is highly 
sensitive to volatile market conditions.  During an economic boom, it may be 
relatively easy and lucrative to complete an IPO of a promising firm on the 
public stock markets; in a depressed market, it may be impossible. 
Id. at 642-43; see also PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157-58 
(2004) (explaining the four obstacles). 
The obstacles can be considered as “contractual risks faced by venture capitalists.”  Utset, supra 
note 26, at 56.  High uncertainty includes “contractual risks associated with the uncertainty surrounding 
the innovation process.”  Id. at 58.  Information asymmetry is taken as “informational risks.”  Id. at 56.  
Intangible soft assets refer to “risks related to the intangible nature of the assets in high-tech start-ups.” 
Id. at 57.  Sensitive to volatile market conditions means “contractual risks due to the general illiquidity 
of venture capital investments.”  Id. at 56-59. 
41 However, proponents for “Schumpeterian hypothesis” may not regard venture capital as 
important for innovation.  They believe that the internal financing of large corporations is more efficient 
for innovation.  Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Venture Capital Start-Up Co-Evolution and the 
Emergence & Development of Israel’s New High Tech Cluster, 13 ECON. INNOV. NEW TECHN. 33, 36 
(2004), available at http://economics.huji.ac.il/facultye/teubal/VC-SU%20coevolution%20EINT%20 
2004%20offprint.pdf. 
42 [M]anagement assistance to the portfolio company [is] analogous to that provided by 
a management consulting firm; intensive monitoring of performance [is] 
reflecting the incentives to monitor arising from equity ownership and the power 
to act using the venture capitalist’s levers of control; and reputational capital . . . 
is[] the venture capitalist’s ability to give the portfolio company credibility with 
third parties, similar to the role played by other reputational intermediaries such 
as investment bankers. 
Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 252; see also Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction 
between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital, 13 THE REV. OF FIN. 
STUD. 959, 960 (2000) (explaining that non-financial services include “mentoring, strategic advice, 
monitoring, certification to outside shareholders, corporate governance, professionalization of the 
company, and recruitment of senior management”). 
43 See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. 
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efficiency generated by venture capital cannot be created by bank loan financing.44  
Accordingly, venture capital financing is best suitable for innovative businesses.45  
A venture start-up has a development life cycle.  The start-up’s demands for 
financial support and management assistance change according to the development 
stage of the company.  Responding to the changing financial demands of the start-
up, characteristics of private equity investors differ in the degree of risk-taking,46 
the relationship with the venture entrepreneur, and the contents of management 
assistance.  Also, there is a difference in the purpose and use of the invested capital 
at each stage.  The development stage of venture business corresponds with the 
financing stage of venture capital.  Accordingly, the development process of 
venture business can be categorized into the following stages: Seed Money Stage, 
Start-Up Stage, Growth Stage, and Pre-Exit Stage.47  And then, at the exit stage, 
the private equity investors of the venture start-up liquidate their investment 
through an IPO, M&A, or backdoor listing.48 
The outline of the development stages of venture business combined with 
financing stages of venture capital is shown in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
FIN. ECON. 473, 506 (1990) (arguing that, to manage the investment risks, venture capitalists “become 
actively involved in managing the companies they fund, in effect functioning as consultants”). 
44 See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 246. 
45 See Gulinello, supra note 13, at 845 (stating that “[i]t is widely agreed that venture capital 
investment is particularly suited for high-risk, potentially high-return business ventures”). 
46 Generally, as the start-up develops, the risks associated with the business diminish. 
47 The stages are categorized by mainly referring to the following two articles: Fredric D. 
Tannenbaum, Venture Capital Financing, in 1 ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES §§ 15:6 to :9 (2006), 
available at WESTLAW, ADVSB §§ 15:6 to :9; Sahlman, supra note 43, at 479 (quoting Plummer’s 
staged venture capital investment theory). 
48 An unlisted company’s going public through the backdoor is called a “backdoor listing.” A 
backdoor listing is a financial technique used for a private or unlisted company to be listed on a well-
organized and actively-traded stock market, bypassing the normal listing process by combining with a 
corporation already listed on the market. 
According to Edna Carew’s financial dictionary, “The Language of Money,” the backdoor listing 
is defined as “[t]he process of achieving stock exchange listing for an enterprise by acquiring an 
already-listed company structure and injecting new activities into it.”  ANZ, http://www.anz.com/edna/ 
dictionary.asp?action=content&content=backdoor_listing (last visited June 8, 2008). 
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Table 1: Financial Sources for a Venture Business Through the Development 
Stages49 
Development
Stage 
Characteristic Purpose Financial Status 
Financial 
Source 
Seed Money 
Stage50 
Company 
Formation and 
Initial R&D51 
 
Successful 
Development 
of Product 
Little or No Product 
and Little or No 
Revenues 
Entrepreneur’s 
Own Money, 
Relatives, 
Friends, and 
Angel Investors52 
Start-Up 
Stage53 
Initial Testing, 
Licensing, and 
Marketing of 
Products 
 
Successful 
Market Entry 
Capital Demands 
Much More Than 
Revenues 
Venture 
Capitals,54 
Lenders but No 
Non-recourse 
Loan  
                                                          
49 The table is created by referring mainly to Tannenbaum’s “Basic Stages and Structures of a  
Venture Capital Investment” and Plummer’s “The Stages of Venture-Capital Investing.”  Tannenbaum, 
supra note 47, §§ 15:6 to :9; Sahlman, supra note 43, at 479. 
50 The investment risk at this stage is the highest of all the financing stages.  Investors at this stage 
take existing “technology and product risk” and future “marketing and sales risk,” while investors at 
later stages take only “marketing and sales risk.”  Bill McAleer, The Various Stages of Investing, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL EXIT STRATEGIES: LEADING VCS ON EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS & 
MANAGEMENT TEAMS – INCLUDING M&A, IPOS, & OTHER OPTIONS 83, 85 (2004).  In return for 
taking high risk, investors at the seed stage receive a relatively large proportion of the equity of the 
invested company.  “The early stage is typically the most dilutive stage to the existing owners since the 
risk to the VC investors is highest. . . .”  Tannenbaum, supra note 47, § 15:6. 
51 A venture start-up “is focused at [the seed money stage] on researching and developing a product 
or service, and therefore the viability of the product or assurance that the seed money will sprout fruit 
are both speculative.”  Tannenbaum, supra note 47, § 15:6. 
52 The angel investor means “[a] financial backer providing venture capital funds for small start-ups 
or entrepreneurs . . . . Typically, angel investors are friends or family members.”  Investopedia, Angel 
Investor http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/angelinvestor.asp (last visited June 8, 2008). 
As of 2000, “angels inject more than $50 billion into young companies each year—more than 
twice what venture capital firms contribute.”  Brian C. Bonner & Laura H. Huggins, “Angel” Investors: 
Using the Internet in the Private Offering of Securities, 11-Jun. S.C. LAW 26, 26 (2000) (citing Emory 
Thomas Jr., Bands of “Angels” Get Organized, available at http://www.nexsenpruet.com/assets/ 
attachments/53.pdf).  The fact shows that “angel investing has been a vital source of capital in” the U.S.  
Id. 
53 The investment risk at this stage is relatively lower than at the seed stage because the technology 
and product risks have been reduced.  Supposing the invested amounts are the same, at this stage, the 
venture capital investors may acquire relatively less proportion of the equity of the invested company 
than angel investors.  From the perspective of the venture capital firm, “[t]he cost of capital to the firm 
. . . will decrease from round to round due to lower risks associated with better forecasts of project 
earnings.”  Yahel Giat, Venture Capital Financing with Staged Investment, Agency Conflicts and 
Asymmetric Beliefs (Dec. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology), 
http://etd.gatech.edu/theses/available/etd-11232005-145909/unrestricted/giat_yahel_200512_phd.pdf. 
54 VCs finance a venture start-up in the form of a staged investment until they exit their investments 
through an IPO or M&A.  See RICHARD J. TESTA, Venture Capital Financing, STARTING UP AND 
ADVISING AN EMERGING MASSACHUSETTES BUSINESS (2001), available at WESTLAW, SUAEM MA-
CLE 7-1 (noting that “[i]n a staged investment, the purchase of additional securities at subsequent 
closings is conditioned upon the accomplishment of certain financial or operational goals . . . as an 
incentive to management to proceed diligently with the development of its business”). 
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Growth 
Stage55 
Market Entry and 
Business 
Expansion  
Expanding 
Revenues and 
Market Share 
Generating 
Revenues or Profits 
Add-On 
Investments by 
Early Stage 
Investors or New 
Venture Capitals 
Pre-Exit 
Stage56 
Expansion or 
Acquisitions 
Initial Public 
Offering 
Generally Profitable 
but Requiring 
Additional Capital 
Bridge or 
Mezzanine57 
Financing 
III. LEGAL STRUCTURE OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: BASED ON THE U.S. 
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACT MODEL 
A. Contractual Design of Venture Capital Investment 
As the term “venture business” is defined above, a venture business is an 
innovative but risky and immature business without credit and collateral.  To 
transform its innovative ideas into profitable products or services, the venture 
business should be funded and supported by specialized investors who can provide 
management assistance 58  and reputation as well as capital. 59   The specialized 
investors, VCs, possess the expertise and reputation to assist and support their 
portfolio companies, but not enough cash to invest.  The retail or institutional60 
investors with cash need VCs’ specialty and experience in evaluating innovative 
ideas or technologies, selecting portfolio companies, and managing risks 
associated with uncertainty and information asymmetry.  Meeting mutual needs, 
VCs and outside investors create venture capital funds.  And VCs serve as 
intermediaries between venture businesses and outside investors to balance both 
                                                          
55 Owing to the start-up’s successful market entry and track record in the market, from the second 
round of the venture capital financing, the risks associated with the venture business are considered to 
be significantly reduced and the company owner incurs less share dilution.  See Sahlman, supra note 43, 
at 479. 
56 At the pre-exit stage, the venture start-up makes profits. Tannenbaum, supra note 47, § 15:8. 
Also, at this stage, the founders of the portfolio company would like to be free from the monitoring and 
control of the VCs and the venture capital investors would like to realize the profits of their 
investments.  Therefore, they plan for an IPO, M&A, or other investment exit event. 
57 At the pre-IPO stage, “additional funds may be required in the few months prior to an expected 
IPO.”  Tannenbaum, supra note 47, § 15:8. The term of the investment at this stage is very short 
because the exit event is coming near. In this respect, the pre-IPO stage is also known as the bridge or 
mezzanine stage.  See Sahlman, supra note 43, at 479. 
58 The management assistance includes providing “management advice and access to better 
suppliers, lenders, employees, and investment bankers.”  Gulinello, supra note 13, at 846. 
59 “Venture capital is therefore a more hands-on type of investment than other, more passive 
investment strategies such as mutual funds.”  Gregory G. Oehler, The Wider Implications of “Implicit” 
Contracts in Venture Capital Partnerships, 1 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 489, 492 (2005) (emphasis changed). 
60 In the U.S., “many limited partners in venture capital partnerships are large pension funds which 
are covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).”  Id. at 490.  “A 
change in the prudent investor rule under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
enabled many large pension funds to funnel capital into venture capital funds.”  Anderson, supra note 
38, at 5 n.23 (citing FERNAN IBANEZ, VENTURE CAPITAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 16 
(1989)) (emphasis changed). 
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parties’ interests.61  Consequently, the typical legal structure of venture capital 
investment consists of two contractual relationships: the VC-investor relationship 
based on the VC partnership agreement and the VC fund-venture business 
relationship based on the investment contract.62 
The key players in the venture capital market—outside investors, VCs, and 
venture entrepreneurs63—have different objectives64 and conflicting interests65 in a 
venture capital investment.  The conflicting interests66 of the key players combined 
with the risky characteristics of the venture business cause major problems 
associated with venture capital investments: “uncertainty, information asymmetry, 
and. . .agency costs.”67  The uncertainty concerns business prospects, management 
quality, and technical uncertainty.68  The information asymmetry between venture 
entrepreneurs and investors stems from investors’ inability to observe the 
“intentions and abilities” of venture entrepreneurs and lack of expertise of cutting-
edge technologies.69   The agency costs are caused by moral hazard,70  adverse 
selection,71 and holdup.72  The key players in a venture capital investment create 
                                                          
61 Duffner, supra note 2, at 89 (asserting that VCs as intermediaries “try to balance the interests of 
investors for return, stability and liquidity and the interests of investees for long-term finance and 
flexibility”). 
62 See generally Sahlman, supra note 43, at 489-503; Gilson, supra note 7, at 1076-92. 
As for analyzing the contractual relationships, as Professor D. Gordon Smith pointed out, 
“because these contracts are not publicly available, analysis of the terms typically used in venture 
capital contracts usually rests on a description of such contracts in secondary sources.”  D. Gordon 
Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 144 
(1998). 
63 See Duffner, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that public investors, venture entrepreneurs, and VCs are 
“three big groups of actors that participate in the financing of young growth companies”).  VCs and 
venture entrepreneurs represent, respectively, venture capital firms and portfolio companies. 
64 See id. (stating that the “three main groups involved in financing young growth companies have 
different objectives”). 
65 See id. at 29 (asserting that “[i]t is obvious that there are tensions between the interests of the 
investors, the intermediaries and the investees”). 
66 “Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among 
agents with conflicting interests.”  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983) (emphasis added). 
67 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1076. 
68 Id. at 1076-77. 
69 Id. at 1077. 
70 Moral hazard means the situation where “the agent [that is, the venture entrepreneur,] will 
intentionally act in a self-interested manner and contrary to the best interests of the principal.”  Smith, 
supra note 62, at 137.  In the moral hazard situation, “the agent (a) uses information not observable by 
the principal (hidden information) or (b) performs actions not observable by the principal (hidden 
action) in order to increase his own utility against the principal’s best interest.”  Duffner, supra note 2, 
at 34. 
71 Adverse selection means the situation where “one party cannot discriminate between good and 
bad quality of the other party, i.e. the other party has hidden characteristics.”  Id.   Consequently, “the 
agent will be incapable of acting in the principal’s best interests because of the agent’s incompetence.”  
Smith, supra note 62, at 137. 
72 Holdup describes situations in which the agent systematically uses gaps in incomplete 
contracts, in which not every future state is specified, in his favor (see Goldberg 
(1976), pp. 439-441). After the closing of the contract and after specific 
investments have been made and sunk costs have been incurred by the principal, 
the agent reveals his previously hidden intentions openly interpreting the 
fulfillment of his commitments in his favor and forcing the principal into 
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the contractual relationships in order to solve the problems caused by uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs.73 
The uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problem are interacted.  
The more uncertain the business environment is, the more problematic the 
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors becomes.  And, the 
more the information asymmetry grows, the more agency costs increase.74  Due to 
the interconnection among those problems, the market players’ responses to solve 
the problems, which are shown as various contractual provisions,75 are interrelated.  
One provision that can solve one problem may aggravate another problem. 76  
Accordingly, the contractual design to address the intrinsic risks associated with 
venture capital investment should be comprehensive.77   Well-designed venture 
capital contract relationship creates virtuous cycles of venture capital and 
guarantees venture business success. 
In the structure of the venture capital investment, the key players use a check 
and balance system to minimize business uncertainties and agency costs by 
utilizing explicit and implicit financial techniques.  In this respect, their 
relationship seems antagonistic.  However, the key players share the ultimate goal 
of a successful investment exit, or to be more specific, a successful IPO. 78  
Consequently, their relationship is both conflicting and cooperative.79 
B. Explicit and Implicit Relationship Between VCs and Outside Investors 
To invest in venture businesses, VCs collect investors 80  and establish a 
                                                          
renegotiations (see e.g. Spremann (1990), pp. 568-570; chapter 4.2).    
Duffner, supra note 2, at 34. 
73 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1077 (explaining that “[t]he organizational and contractual structure of 
the U.S. venture capital market responds to [the] trio of problems”).  Avnimelech & Teubal, supra note 
41, at 36 (stating that “VC structure and operation thus creates a way to overcome financial and 
organizational barriers that held back both innovation in large corporations and R&D project investment 
by traditional financial institutions”). 
74 Cf. Smith, supra note 62, at 157 (stating that “[m]oral hazard and adverse selection are both 
caused by informational asymmetries”). 
75 A venture capital contract contains various provisions to address information asymmetries and 
agency problems “because entrepreneurs and venture capitalists face multiple market imperfections in 
their relationships.” Zsuzsanna Fluck et al., Venture Capital Contracting: Staged Financing and 
Syndication of Later-stage Investments, 1 (Research Paper, 2006), available at http://www.bi.no/Oslo 
Files/ccgr/Fluck_Garrison_myers.pdf.  For examples of the provisions, see infra notes 122-128. 
76 Fluck et al., supra note 75, at 1. 
77 See id. at 4 (arguing that “combining staged financing with other venture capital clauses can 
alleviate the hold up problem and improve efficiency”). 
78  Smith, supra note 62, at 139. 
79  See id. (referring the venture capital relationship as a “cooperative relationship”); id. at 138 n.14 
(contrasting the “pure agency relationship” with the “cooperative relationship” by quoting an article of 
Jensen and Meckling). 
80 The venture capital firm solicits investors by issuing a prospectus detailing the 
purpose and scope of the fund to be raised and the nature of the investments 
sought. The prospectus also details the legal form that will govern the 
relationship between the venture capital firm and the fund participants (i.e., 
investors). 
Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency Costs Play a Role? 
Was it Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 216 (2001).    
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venture investment organization, usually in the form of a limited partnership.81  
The limited partnership is organized “as a pooled fund.”82  As a typical venture 
capital limited partnership agreement provides, the VCs assume unlimited personal 
liabilities as general partners (“GPs”) and the outside investors are only 
responsible for the invested amount as limited partners (“LPs”).83  GPs 
contribute about one percent of the fund’s capital but exercise full control over the 
operation of the VC fund while LPs84 contribute about ninety nine percent of the 
capital85 but have few managerial rights.86  The concentration of managerial rights 
                                                          
81 “In the early 1960s, the first venture capital fund organized as a limited partnership was formed. 
Since then, the vast majority of funding for venture capital in the United States has derived from funds 
organized as limited partnerships.”  Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 365. 
“Limited-partnership income is not subject to corporate taxation; instead income is taxable to the 
individual partners. Also, partnerships can distribute securities without triggering immediate 
recognition of taxable income: the gain or loss on the underlying asset is recognized only when the asset 
is sold.”  Sahlman, supra note 43, at 489. 
While the predominant form of organization is the limited partnership, in recent 
years the tax code has allowed the formation of either Limited Liability 
Partnerships, (“LLPs”), or Limited Liability Companies (“LLCs”), as alternative 
forms of organization. . . . The advantages and disadvantages of each has [sic] to 
do with liability, taxation issues and management responsibility. 
National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited June 8, 
2008). 
82 Sahlman, supra note 43, at 489. 
83 Id. at 489-90. 
In real practice, the party of the venture capital limited partnership agreement is not an individual 
but an LP or LLC. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND 
PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 34:14 (2007), available at WESTLAW, 
Partnership Law & Practice § 34:14; see also Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 366 (stating that “[t]he 
limited partners who invest in venture capital are often huge pension funds, university endowments and 
other entities that are in no position to oversee and monitor their investments”). 
84 “Despite restrictions on their managerial rights, limited partners are almost always permitted to 
vote on key issues such as amendment of the limited-partnership agreement, dissolution of the 
partnership before the termination date, extension of the fund’s life, removal of any general partner, and 
valuation of the portfolio.”  Sahlman, supra note 43, at 490.  However, “limited partners have much less 
power than, for example, the shareholders of a close corporation.”  Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 380.  
In essence, LPs are “passive investors.”  Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Partnerships Revisited, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 953, 958 (1999) (emphasizing that “[t]he main feature of the limited partnership historically 
has been its combination of the general partnership, with powerful owner-managers, and passive 
corporate-like investors”). 
85 The LPs’ capital contributions are made over time by responding to capital calls from GPs.  The 
following quotation explains the capital call commitment: 
An investor becomes a limited partner by “subscribing” to one or more shares of 
the fund at issue.  Subscriptions are obtained by agreeing to a capital call 
commitment. Under a capital call commitment, limited partners are obligated to 
forward specified amounts of capital whenever the general partners issue a 
capital call. Funds establish a timetable for regular capital contributions over a 
designated period of time, typically two years, with contributions being made 
quarterly. The schedule of regular capital calls is designed to result in the raising 
of the fund’s articulated capital goal. 
Bankman & Cole, supra note 80, at 216. 
86 Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 366; Sahlman, supra note 43, at 490; see also Gilson, supra note 7, 
at 1088 (arguing that “[o]rganizing the venture capital fund as a limited partnership serves to vest 
virtually complete control in the GP”); cf. Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) § 302 (2001) 
(providing that “[a] limited partner does not have the right or the power as a limited partner to act for or 
bind the limited partnership”); id. at § 404(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided…all 
general partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the limited partnership unless 
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on GPs helps make the operation of the VC fund economically efficient. 87  
However, on the other side of the coin of GPs’ exclusive managerial control, LPs’ 
rights to check and monitor GPs’ activities are few.88  GPs’ exclusive managerial 
rights that are far too great compared to their capital contribution can give rise to 
information asymmetries and agency problems.  For example, a GP may have an 
incentive to invest in unduly higher-risk and higher-return businesses because the 
expected “twenty percent carried interest” is much greater than the possible loss of 
a “one percent capital contribution.” 89   Even though the GP bears unlimited 
liability, this does not effectively suppress the incentive for risky behavior on 
account of the fact that the GP is not inclined to take risks to the extent that the 
potential liabilities exceed the value of the fund’s assets.90  However, mechanisms 
based on explicit and implicit contracts between VCs and outside investors address 
the problems concerning agency costs and information asymmetry. 
  Restrictive covenants and compensation provisions included in the limited 
partnership agreement function as sticks and carrots91 to control GPs’ excessive 
managerial discretion.92  Restrictive covenants serve to control GPs’ opportunistic 
activities in a negative way.  The covenants are divided into three categories: 
“those relating to the overall management of the fund, the activities of the general 
partners, and the permissible types of investments.” 93   The compensation 
provisions function to control GPs’ opportunistic activities in a positive way.  Even 
though GPs receive two or three percent annual management fees94 on the initial 
amount invested, their main income source is twenty percent carried interest on 
profits.95  The carried interest compensation scheme reduces problems concerning 
                                                          
otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law”). 
87 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1088 (stating that “[b]y investing through a financial intermediary, 
investors secure the benefit of the GP’s skill and experience, which help to reduce the level of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry that must be addressed in the contract governing a portfolio 
company’s investment”). 
88 At the cost of few control rights, LPs enjoy the benefits of “limited liability and flow-through 
taxation status.”  Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 384.  “While limited partners can serve on advisory 
boards that review certain policy issues, if they become involved in the day-to-day management of a 
venture fund, they risk losing their limited liability.”  GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 65.  Also, 
“[t]he need to retain the flow-through taxation status of limited partnerships can impose great 
restrictions on the ability of the limited partners to protect their investments.”  Rosenberg, supra note 
39, at 386. 
89 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1088; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 383. 
90 Sahlman, supra note 43, at 490; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 385-86. 
91 In this context, sticks and carrots mean monitoring and incentives.  As well as for the relationship 
between VCs and investors, the combination of sticks and carrots are used for the relationship between 
VCs and entrepreneurs.  “The carrot of stock options motivates the managers, but they are worried 
about the stick that the venture capitalists wield as monitors.”  Bankman & Cole, supra note 80, at 211. 
(emphasis changed).  Therefore, the incentive and monitoring structure is one of the main 
characteristics of venture capital contracting.  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1078. 
92 Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 381. 
93 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 73. 
94 “The venture capitalists have historically received a 2 percent management fee, but in recent 
years this fee has gone up to 3 percent.”  Bankman & Cole, supra note 80, at 225. 
95 “In private equity, there is a general rule of 2 and 20 - a 2% yearly management fee (usually paid 
quarterly) plus a 20% carry.”  PureVC, VC Primer: Management Fees, http://www.purevc.com/pure_ 
vc/2006/03/vc_primer_manag.html (last visited June 8, 2008); see also Gilson, supra note 7, at 1089; 
Sahlman, supra note 43, at 491.  “The remaining share of any fund investments is held by the limited 
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agency costs and information asymmetry by aligning GPs’ interests with those of 
LPs. 96   However, the explicit covenants cannot prohibit all of the possible 
opportunistic activities of GPs because venture investment activities are 
unpredictable and complicated.  The loopholes of explicit contractual provisions 
are closed by implicit contractual mechanisms.  
  The venture capital fund has a fixed term97 and, when the term expires, the 
realized investment proceeds should be distributed to LPs, the outside investors.98  
Based on the performance and returns of the VC fund, the outside investors can 
compare the profitability of the venture capital investment with other investments 
and appraise the competence and dedication of their VCs.99  Depending on the 
evaluation after the investment exit,100 the investors decide whether to invest in the 
successor funds created by the same VCs.101  The existence of the investors’ post-
exit evaluation makes VCs expect that, if their investment performance is 
successful, their investors will reinvest in successor funds. 102   The shared 
expectation by VCs and investors, which is based on economically reasonable 
investment activities, creates an implicit contract where investors reinvest in the 
successor funds raised by the same VCs in return for the success of their previous 
investment that is indicated by a successful investment exit.103  The implicit terms 
combined with the explicit terms of a fixed investment period104 serve to prevent 
VCs from abusing their disproportionate managerial power. 
  The implicit contract is not enforceable at law but, as a matter of economic 
                                                          
partners on a pro rata share basis.”  Bankman & Cole, supra note 80, at 216.  
96 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1089.  However, the carried interest compensation can bring about 
agency problems.  An example is as follows: 
[S]uppose that the first investment realized by the venture capital fund yields a $1 
million profit after a return to the investors of their $1 million investment. The 
GP’s share of the profit is $200,000. Now suppose that the next investment 
realized losses of $500,000, leaving cumulative profits from the two investments 
of $500,000. If the GP keeps all of its first $200,000 distribution, then it ends up 
having received not twenty percent of the venture capital fund’s profits from the 
two investments, but forty percent ($200,000/ $500,000). This would give the GP 
an incentive to realize profitable investments before unprofitable investments, 
even if that meant realizing the profitable investments prematurely. 
Id. 
97 The life span of a venture capital fund is usually ten to thirteen years. GOMPERS & LERNER, 
supra note 40, at 14. 
98 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1089-90. 
99 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 256. 
100 As a result of an exit event, the return on an investment can “take the form of cash or stock in 
the acquiring company or a distribution of stock from the IPO.”  Thomas J. Fogarty, Exit Strategies: 
Making the Best Decision, in VENTURE CAPITAL EXIT STRATEGIES: LEADING VCS ON EXIT 
STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND MANAGEMENT TEAMS – INCLUDING M&A, IPOS, & OTHER 
OPTIONS 35, 36 (2004). 
101 Consequently, “payment of the exit proceeds to capital providers lets the capital providers 
recycle funds from less successful to more successful venture capital managers.”  Black & Gilson, 
supra note 6, at 256. 
102 See id. 
103 Id.; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 396. 
104 In practice, “the implicit/explicit dichotomy presented above oversimplifies the real world. In 
fact, some elements of the contract over control are explicit, while others are left implicit.”  Black & 
Gilson, supra note 6, at 264. 
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reality, is binding on the parties by mechanism of reputation in the venture capital 
community.105  If a VC breaches the implicit contract by doing an opportunistic 
conduct, the VC will see his or her reputation damaged and have trouble in raising 
successor funds from current and prospective investors.106  If an investor ignores 
the implicit contract enforced by the reputational sanction and takes legal action 
against an unsuccessful VC, the investor will be notoriously known “for being 
difficult to work with”107 in the venture investment community and thus have 
difficulty in joining a profitable fund.108  Actually, therefore, there are not many 
legal disputes between VCs and outside investors.109  
In a venture capital limited partnership agreement, VCs as GPs hold 
enormous managerial rights,110 but outside investors as LPs have little ex-ante 
control over the GPs’ discretion111 and little ex-post legal relief.112  The reputation 
market-based implicit mechanism combined with the fund’s fixed investment 
period aligns the interests of VCs and investors113 and controls their opportunistic 
behaviors by means of reputational sanctions.114  The implicit contracts have more 
influence on the operation of a venture capital limited partnership than the explicit 
contracts have.115 
                                                          
105 Oehler, supra note 59, at 496-98; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 394-97.  Professor Rosenberg 
argues that “[t]he term implicit contract is arguably just a proxy for reputation.”  Rosenberg, supra note 
39, at 397 (emphasis changed).   Also, he points out that Professors “Black and Gilson are plainly not 
arguing that either party to a venture capital fund could enforce the implicit contract in court.”  Id. at 
397 n.120. 
106 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1090; cf. Andrea Schertler, Path Dependencies in Venture Capital 
Markets, at 29 (Kiel Working Paper No. 1120, 2002) (arguing that “[v]enture capitalists have to build 
reputation, i.e., a track record for successfully financing high-technology enterprises, because they have 
to raise funds from outside investors that initially have little information about the profitability of 
venture capital investments”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=318907. 
107 Oehler, supra note 59, at 497. 
108 “Therefore, limited partners [who are outside investors] have an incentive to behave well and 
not get a reputation for being difficult.”  Id.  Cf. Bankman & Cole, supra note 80, at 217 (explaining 
that it is competitive for outside investors to participate in prestigious VC funds). 
109 See Oehler, supra note 59, at 495 (stating that “there are no major cases where limited partners 
have successfully sued general partners for breach of their fiduciary duties”); cf. Rosenberg, supra note 
39, at 390 (explaining that “default fiduciary duties play little role in the relationship between venture 
capitalists and investors”). 
110 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1088. 
111 “If limited partners attempt to exercise control over the partnership, they risk losing their status 
as limited partners and the corresponding beneficial flow-through taxation status.”  Oehler, supra note 
59, at 494. 
112 Id. 
113 “The two parties[’] interests’ [sic] are aligned when limited partners give general partners 
maximum freedom to invest in exchange for the insurance that the general partners will not get paid and 
may put their reputations as good venture capital fund managers at risk if they do not invest wisely.”  
Id. at 498. 
114 Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 397; Oehler, supra note 59, at 497. 
115 Oehler, supra note 59, at 495 (stating that “the implicit contract - rather than the written 
document - governs the partnership”). 
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C. Explicit and Implicit Relationship Between VC Fund and Venture 
Business 
After raising capital for the VC fund, VCs thoroughly assess the feasibility 
and marketability of the innovation of a targeting company and evaluate the 
competitiveness of the management by reviewing business plans that venture start-
ups submit.116  Through the review with “due diligence,”117 the VC fund selects 
companies, negotiates the contract terms, and signs the investment contracts with 
them.118  The intensive pre-screening by VCs119 cannot remove the intrinsic risks 
associated with venture capital investments: “uncertainty,” “information 
asymmetry,” and “agency costs.”120  Those problems are monitored and controlled 
all through the investment period by operation of incentive and control 
mechanisms based on the contracts between the VC fund and the portfolio 
company.121   
The contractual mechanisms to reduce the risks associated with investing in 
a portfolio company contain staged financing,122 syndication of investments,123 
disproportionate allocation of control,124 incentive-based compensation system,125 
                                                          
116 Anderson, supra note 38, at 5. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 6. 
119 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, 
Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 428 (2001) (stating that “VC’s expend a great deal 
of time and effort in evaluating and screening transactions”). 
120 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1076. 
121 Id. at 1078-87. 
122 The staged financing responds to the three major risks associated with investments in venture 
start-ups.  First, through staged financing, venture investors can manage uncertainties by having an 
option to stop follow-on investment.  Id. at 1078-79.  Second, the “[s]taged financing . . . reduces 
agency costs by shifting the decision whether to continue the project from the entrepreneur to the 
venture capital fund.”  Id. at 1080 (emphasis added).  Lastly, the staged financing narrows the 
information asymmetry between the VC fund and the portfolio company by “the incentive created by 
staged financing” and “its impact on the credibility of the projections contained in the entrepreneur’s 
business plan.”  Id. at 1080-81 (emphasis added); see also Sahlman, supra note 43, at 506-07; GOMPERS 
& LERNER, supra note 40, at 171-200. 
123 “Venture capitalists never fully fund an investment alone.  They almost always syndicate the 
investment with other local companies, particularly those that have large funds.”  Wyse, supra note 2, at 
1284.  “This so-called syndication can either take place at the same round of financing or be sequential, 
with new partners coming in at later rounds of financing.”  Catherine Casamatta & Carole 
Haritchabalet, Experience, Screening and Syndication in Venture Capital Investments, 16 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 368, 368 (2007).  The syndication is intended “to obtain a second opinion about the 
quality of a particular investment under consideration” (“selection hypothesis”) or to “add value to a 
given project” (“value-added hypothesis”).  James A. Brander et al., Venture-Capital Syndication: 
Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value-Added Hypothesis, 11 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 423, 
449 (2002); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 255-71. 
124 The disproportionate allocation of control to a VC fund responds to the three major risks 
associated with venture investments.  First, a VC fund having more control than its equity enables the 
VCs to “deal with uncertainty by means of a governance structure: creating a process that will 
determine the response to an unexpected event.”  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1082 (emphasis added).  
Second, “disproportionate representation,” “negative covenants,” and options for further funding, which 
are provided through the disproportionate allocation, serve to decrease agency costs.  Id.  Lastly, 
“[o]ngoing monitoring by the venture capital fund, made possible by the disproportionate allocation of 
control, balances” the information asymmetry between the VC fund and the portfolio company because 
the VCs’ know-how to monitor increases as the entrpreneurs’ know-how to manage grows.  Id. at 1083.  
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convertible securities,126 entrepreneurs’ compensation system,127 and VCs’ rights 
regarding investment exit.128  As a result of the contracting, a great deal of explicit 
and implicit control129 is transferred from the entrepreneur to the VC fund, or to be 
more exact, VCs.130  VCs’ huge portion of control rights and option to stop further 
rounds of funding131 give rise to problems of VCs’ moral hazard.132  Abusing the 
                                                          
In addition, “the allocation of control serves to reduce information asymmetry by providing the 
entrepreneur the opportunity to signal . . . . her confidence in her own skills.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
“The contractual sources of venture capitalist control are (1) the preferred stock purchase 
agreement, (2) the terms of the preferred stock, (3) the stockholders’ agreement, and (4) employment 
agreements.”  Utset, supra note 26, at 61; see also Sahlman, supra note 43, at 508-09; GOMPERS & 
LERNER, supra note 40, at 241-54. 
125 The structure of the entrepreneur’s compensation responds primarily to agency costs 
and information asymmetry problems. . . . [T]he portfolio company’s 
compensation structure creates extremely high-powered performance incentives 
that serve to align the incentives of the portfolio company management and the 
venture capital fund. . . . 
 . . . [T]he intensity of the performance incentives created by the compensation 
structure gives rise to a corresponding incentive for the venture capital fund to 
monitor the portfolio company’s performance. This monitoring, together with the 
signaling properties of the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept such powerful 
incentives, also serves to reduce information asymmetries. 
Gilson, supra note 7, at 1083-84; see also Sahlman, supra note 43, at 508. 
126 By utilizing convertible securities according to the performance of the portfolio company, the 
VCs can flexibly deal with business uncertainties.  “[I]f the company succeeds, they can convert this 
senior security into common stock, but if the firm fails or barely becomes profitable, they will receive a 
priority over the firm’s founders for the limited proceeds available for distribution.”   JOHN C. COFFEE, 
JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (9th ed. 2003).  In 
addition, “[A] convertible security is a powerful instrument to mitigate the double moral hazard 
problem between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. . . .”  Klaus M. Schmidt, Convertible 
Securities and Venture Capital Finance 2 (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 217, 2001) (emphasis 
added), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=273642; see also George G. Triantis, Financial Contract 
Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 316-19 (2001). 
127 “Generally, entrepreneurs are paid a salary that is below market with the expectation that the 
bulk of their compensation will come from appreciation of their base equity holdings and be 
supplemented by stock options awarded during the venture.”  This compensation system aligns the 
interests of the entrepreneurs with the VCs’.  Utset, supra note 26, at 63-64. 
128 Venture capital contracts achieve [investment exit] through three principal 
mechanisms: (1) a registration rights agreement, which usually requires that the 
venture file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in order to effectuate an initial public offering; (2) the venture 
capitalist’s voting control over the company’s equity and control over the board 
of directors; and (3) redemption rights--that is, a “put” that forces the venture to 
buy back the venture capitalist’s preferred stock (of course, this is of little use if 
there are no assets to pay for the redemption). 
Id. at 68. 
   “If the company is a success, the venture capitalist can steer it towards an IPO or an acquisition. 
Failures move toward liquidation or redemption.”  D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture 
Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 356 (2005).  See generally Sahlman, supra note 43, at 506-513; Gilson, 
supra note 7, at 1078-87; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 171-271. 
129 The explicit control includes “disproportionate representation[,] . . .control of the portfolio 
company’s board of directors, and the restriction of the entrepreneur’s discretion through the use of 
negative covenants.”  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1082.  The implicit control is exercised by VCs’ 
“decision of whether to fund the portfolio company’s next milestone.”  Id. 
130 Id. at 1085. 
131 Usually, options to stop further rounds of funding are complemented by rights of first refusal.  
Sahlman, supra note 43, at 507.  The rights of first refusal “restrict the entrepreneur’s access to other 
sources of funding[.]”  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1086. 
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control rights or options to stop,133 VCs may engage in opportunistic behaviors 
that have negative consequence for the entrepreneurs.134  In addition, the VCs may 
turn out to be incompetent, bringing about adverse selection problems.135  The 
agency problems involved in the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs are 
not one-sided as shown in the traditional corporate-shareholder relationship but 
mutual and reciprocal.136 
Generally, the explicit terms of a venture capital contract are not enough to 
solve the problems of agency costs incurred by entrepreneurs.137  However, VCs’ 
opportunistic behaviors and incompetence are easily observed in the 
geographically and socially focused venture capital community and surely 
punished in the reputation market.138  The evaluation of VCs’ characteristics in the 
reputation market 139  efficiently responds to problems concerning VCs’ moral 
hazard and hold-up140 and entrepreneurs’ adverse selection.141  A VC is a repeat 
                                                          
132 “[T]he potential for opportunism arises from the possibility that the venture capitalist will 
attempt to renegotiate with the entrepreneur at a point in the relationship when the entrepreneur has 
diminished bargaining power.”  Smith, supra note 62, at 141; see also Gilson, supra note 7, at 1085-86.   
133 If a VC exercises the option and stops the follow-on investment, the bad influence on the 
portfolio company will be remarkable.  It is “not only because it would deprive the company of a likely 
source of funds, but also because it would send a no-confidence signal to other investors.”  Bankman & 
Cole, supra note 80, at 221.   
134 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 263; Gilson, supra note 7, at 1086. 
135 The adverse selection problems resulting in VCs’ poor management support will be serious 
“because the [investment] relationship is ongoing.”  Smith, supra note 62, at 143. 
136 Id. at 139. 
137 Professor Smith argues that some “forms of moral hazard — specifically, those associated with 
[VCs’] opportunism — are not usually addressed by venture capital contracts.”  Id. at 152.  Also, he 
claims that explicit terms do not respond to the “entrepreneur’s adverse selection problem” by stating as 
follows: 
The entrepreneur’s only effective contractual protection against adverse selection 
(which can be combated after entering a venture capital contract only by 
terminating the relationship) is discretionary stock redemption. Discretionary 
stock redemption provisions allow entrepreneurs to repurchase the stock sold to 
venture capitalists at a predetermined price. . . . Indeed, discretionary stock 
redemption provisions are sufficiently rare in modern venture capital contracts 
that many venture capitalists claim never to have seen them. 
The absence of discretionary stock redemption provisions from most modern 
venture capital contracts suggests that the cost to the entrepreneur of protecting 
against adverse selection through contract are [sic] greater than the risks. . . . 
Id. at 152-53. 
138 See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 262-63 (explaining that the “reputation market can police 
this potential for opportunism”). Cf. Utset, supra note 26, at 112 n.223. 
139 Professor Gilson suggests three requirements for the efficient reputation market.  First, the 
observed party should be a repeat player in the community.  Second, the market participants should 
share common expectations of the observed party’s behaviors.  Lastly, the participants can observe the 
party’s conformity to the common expectations. Professor Gilson argues that all the requirements are 
met in the U.S. venture capital market.  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1086; see also Smith, supra note 62, at 
160. 
140 “The hold up problem arises because staged financing gives disproportionate bargaining power 
to the incumbent venture capitalist in later stages of investment since an incumbent venture capitalist is 
potentially better informed about the project than outsiders.”  Fluck et al., supra note 75, at 1. 
141 “For moral hazard, reputational concerns provide incentives to venture capitalists to refrain from 
opportunistic behavior. With respect to adverse selection, on the other hand, reputation is employed as a 
sorting device.”  Smith, supra note 62, at 157; see also Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 262-63. 
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player in the small venture capital community.142  If a VC becomes notorious for 
opportunism or incompetence, he or she will be punished by having trouble raising 
successor funds and/or investing in new venture start-ups.143   
When large corporate control rights are transferred from entrepreneurs to 
VCs under the investment contract, the entrepreneurs expect to regain the control 
rights at the time of a successful IPO. 144   The entrepreneurs’ expectation of 
corporate control recovery can be considered a “call option on control,”145 created 
under the combination of explicit and implicit contracts between the VCs and 
entrepreneurs.  The call option, exercisable in the event of an IPO, provides 
entrepreneurs with strong incentives for the success of the portfolio companies.146  
The explicit contracts regarding the recovery of control rights include the “terms of 
the preferred stock” and the “negative covenants in investors’ rights 
agreements.”147  It is, however, technically impossible that the explicit contracts 
specify requirements to trigger the exercise of the option because the success or 
IPO eligibility of a portfolio company can hardly be defined in the explicit terms of 
contract.148  The implicit terms of the contract provide that a VC should cooperate 
for the portfolio company’s IPO when an independent underwriter decides that the 
company is eligible for an IPO, which results in returning corporate control to the 
entrepreneurs.149  The implicit terms are enforceable by the mechanism of the 
reputation market.150  If the VC unfairly opposes the possible IPO, the news will 
                                                          
142 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets 
and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation 18 (U. Pa., Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 
265, 1999), available at http://search.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=145529; see also Black & 
Gilson, supra note 6, at 254 (arguing that “[t]he venture capital fund’s proffer of its reputation to third 
parties who have dealings with a portfolio company is credible because the fund is a repeat player”). 
143 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1086-87; Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 263; Smith, supra note 
62, at 149 (quoting Sahlman, supra note 43, at 513).  
144 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1083-84. 
The “IPO exit model” is based on the following three assumptions: 
(i) the entrepreneur places substantial private value on control over the company 
she starts; (ii) it is not feasible for an untested entrepreneur to retain control at the 
time of the initial venture capital financing; and (iii) it is feasible for a successful 
entrepreneur to reacquire control from the venture capitalist when the venture 
capitalist exits.   
Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 258. 
145 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1084. 
146 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 261. 
147 “The terms of the preferred stock almost universally require conversion into common stock, 
with the resulting disappearance of special board representation, on a public offering. The negative 
covenants in investors’ rights agreements also typically expire on an IPO.”  Gilson, supra note 7, at 
1084-85 (citation omitted). 
148 “[T]he venture capitalist will be willing to cede control only at the time of exit, not before.  Yet 
a mechanical formula cannot ensure that a reputable underwriter will be willing to take the portfolio 
company public.”  Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 264 (accordingly, concluding that the timing of 
entrepreneur’s recovery of control rights is “substantially implicit in fact, even if explicit in form” and 
emphasizing the advantage of the implicit contract in the matter of the control recovery); see also id. at 
262. 
149 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1085. 
150 The implicit contract is enforceable under the following conditions: “(i) whose terms are clear; 
(ii) whose satisfaction by the entrepreneur is observable; and (iii) whose breach by the venture capital 
provider would be observable and punished by the market.”  Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 262.  As 
for the venture capital investment contract, all the conditions are met.  The delegation of the authority to 
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circulate among entrepreneurs and investors in the small venture capital 
community creating a bad reputation, which will negatively influence the future 
performance of the VC.151  As is in the relationship between VCs and outside 
investors, the implicit contractual structure of the VC fund-venture business 
relationship is based on the availability of the reputation market and the IPO 
exit.152 
D. Characteristics of Mechanisms in Venture Capital Relationships 
Professor Gilson’s theory on the characteristics of the contractual and 
organizational mechanisms of the venture capital relationships suggests the 
following three combinations: strong incentive and monitoring; explicit and 
implicit contracts; and the VC-investor relationship and the VC fund-venture 
business relationship.153   
First, the combination of strong incentive and monitoring in the venture 
capital relationships is to solve the principal-agent problems, including 
informational asymmetry and agency costs.154  The incentive system aligns the 
interests of key players in the venture capital market, who have different 
investment objectives.155  The interest alignment mechanism includes sanctions, 
such as discharging directors and abandoning follow-on investments, as well as 
awards, such as carried interests and stock options.156   The interest alignment 
responds to moral hazard, adverse selection, and holdup.157   VCs’ monitoring 
activities incorporate supporting and advising the management in addition to 
monitoring management’s performance and replacing incompetent management.158  
The monitoring measures address the problems of moral hazard and holdup.159  
The incentive structure and the monitoring activities are interactive and 
interconnected.  Accordingly, venture capital contracting and monitoring activities 
are mutually affected.160 
Second, the combined utilization of explicit and implicit contracts in the 
venture capital investment enhances the economic efficiency and responds to the 
principal-agent problems.  The structures of the explicit and implicit contracts are 
described in the following Figure 2: 
                                                          
evaluate the company to independent underwriters satisfies the first and second requirements. The 
existence of the reputation market in the geographically and socially focused venture capital community 
meets the third requirement.  Id. at 262-63. 
151 Id. at 263.    
152 See id. at 259.    
153 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1078. 
154 Id. 
155 See Duffner, supra note 2, at 29.  
156 See id. at 52 (listing the interest alignment measures: “[p]artly success-dependent remuneration,” 
“[s]anctions, e.g. earn-outs,” “[e]ntrepreneur has to provide a collateral,” “[u]se of convertible debt,” 
and “[m]ajority share held by the entrepreneur”). 
157 Id. at 53. 
158 Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 119, at 429; see also Duffner, supra note 2, at 52 (stating that 
monitoring is “[f]acilitated through management support”). 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 429-30. 
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Figure 2: Explicit and Implicit Contracts161 
Explicit Contractual 
Relationship 
 Implicit Contractual Relationship 
(In the Event of an Exit through an IPO)  
 
 
In the relationships among key players in the venture capital market, VCs are given 
a great deal of corporate control.162  The VCs’ disproportionately allocated control 
over the VC fund or the portfolio company is not easily controlled by explicit 
contract provisions163 and accordingly may cause another type of principal-agent 
problem.164  However, the implicit contractual mechanism based on the reputation 
market discourages VCs from abusing their control. 165   Considering that the 
venture capital contracts are contingent and the explicit terms cannot provide for 
all possible situations,166 the role of implicit contracts is dominant in the venture 
capital investment.167 
Third, the VC-investor relationship based on the venture partnership 
agreement and the VC fund-venture business relationship based on the investment 
contract are interrelated.  The interrelationship minimizes the risks associated with 
the venture investment and maximizes the efficiency of the venture capital 
contracting. 168   Professor Gilson emphasizes that the “braiding of the two 
                                                          
161 This figure is created by referring to the diagrams of Professors Black and Gilson.  See Black & 
Gilson, supra note 6, at 256 fig.2 (diagramming the “[i]mplicit and explicit contracts between venture 
capitalists and outside investors”); id. at 260 fig.3 (diagramming the “[i]mplicit and explicit contracts 
between venture capitalist and entrepreneur”). 
162 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1081-83 (explaining VCs’ control in the VC fund-venture business 
relationship); id. at 1088 (explaining VCs’ control in the VC-investor relationship). 
163 See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 119, at 427 (arguing that the disproportionate control 
structure “suggests that, despite the prevalence of contingent contracting, contracts are inherently 
incomplete”). 
164 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1092. 
165 See id.; Smith, supra note 62, at 158-62; Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 394-97 (explaining the 
reputation-based implicit contract between VCs and outside investors).    
166 See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 263.    
167 See id. (arguing that “an implicit contract is likely to have a comparative advantage over an 
explicit contract”). 
168 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091.    
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contracts”169 is clearly found in the mechanisms of the reputation market and the 
investment exit.170  The VCs’ reputation gained in one relationship, whether good 
or bad, has an impact on the other relationship.  If a VC loses his or her reputation 
by behaving opportunistically in the VC fund-venture business relationship, the 
VC will have a great difficulty in successor fund raising,171 where the relationship 
is between VCs and outside investors.172  On the contrary, if the VC achieves a 
reputation among entrepreneurs as a competent and honest financier, the VC gains 
more access to the other promising venture start-ups and therefore attracts more 
outside investors.173   The availability of the reputational sanction through the 
interaction of the two contracts not only controls the discretion of VCs174 but also 
provides them strong incentives for faithful service. 
In both the VC-investor relationship and the VC fund-venture business 
relationship, the investment exit is inevitably scheduled, respectively, by the “fixed 
term” of the venture partnership agreement and by the VCs’ “incentive to realize 
and then distribute the proceeds of the investment”175 to outside investors.176  As 
well as addressing the problems associated with the venture capital investment, the 
investment exit enhances the efficiency of the two relationships through the 
efficient allocation of the economic resources.  The more a portfolio company 
grows gaining reputation and the company’s entrepreneurs accumulate 
management and marketing experiences, the less they need VCs’ nonfinancial 
supports. 177   When the portfolio companies grow and mature enough to be 
independent of VCs’ support, the outside investors want to realize their 
investments178 and the entrepreneurs would like to regain the corporate control179 
                                                          
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 In this context, the fund raising means the “process that venture firms go through in seeking 
investment commitments from investors.” National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), http://www. 
nvca.org/def.html (last visited June 8, 2008). 
172 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1092. 
173 Id.    
174 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
175 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091. 
176 As a venture capital fund has a limited term with an exit plan, VCs start to prepare for the 
investment exit event from the beginning of the investment.  A venture capital expert states that “[a]s 
venture capitalists, we are analyzing exit strategies from the inception of our involvement with a 
company.”  Michael Carus, Maximizing Exit Opportunities, in VENTURE CAPITAL EXIT STRATEGIES: 
LEADING VCS ON EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND MANAGEMENT TEAMS – INCLUDING 
M&A, IPOS, & OTHER OPTIONS 10 (2004).  The “VC wants to insist at the front end that the portfolio 
company and its other shareholders sign an agreement which gives the VC control over issues such as 
the timing of IPO, selection of underwriter, and right to demand additional SEC registrations 
subsequent to the IPO.”  K. Thomas Liaw, Efficient Capital Markets, Venture Capital Investments and 
Exits, in APEC SEMINAR ON VENTURE CAPITAL AND START-UP COMPANIES 86 (2003), available at 
http://www.apec.org/apec/enewsletter/aug_vol3/publication.primarycontentparagraph.0002.LinkURL.D
ownload.ver5.1.9.   
177 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 255. 
178 See id. at 256 (pointing out that “venture capital funds have strong incentives to exit from their 
investments, when feasible, well before the end of the partnership period”). 
179 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091 (emphasizing that the entrepreneurs have “an important 
performance incentive: a call option on control”). 
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from the VCs.180  By exiting their investments in portfolio companies, venture 
capital market players can meet their mutual demands and the VCs can provide 
their services to new venture start-ups.  Through this process, the economies of 
scope are achieved.181 
Adding to the three characteristics of the mechanisms of the venture capital 
market, another important characteristic is the cycling of the venture capital 
investment process.  The venture capital investment consists of the following 
stages: fund-raising, investing, and exiting.182  After exiting their investments, VCs 
raise successor funds to invest in new venture start-ups.183  Given the recurring 
process of venture capital, it should “be viewed as a cycle.”184   The cyclical 
characteristic of the venture capital investment is systematically related to exit and 
reputation markets.  Active exit markets are indispensable for the virtuous cycle of 
venture capital.185  In the venture capital cycle, VCs acts as repeat players in both 
the venture capital market186  and the exit market.187   The cyclical investment 
process makes VCs’ reputations an essential factor for exiting investments and 
raising successor funds.188   Reputation and exit markets are supported by the 
cycling mechanism of venture capital.189 
All the phases of the venture capital cycle should be understood as a whole 
because each phase is interrelated.190  Each of two major contractual relationships 
                                                          
180 Therefore, “[t]he type of exit is an important issue not only for the venture capitalist, but also for 
the entrepreneur.” Armin Schwienbacher, Innovation and Venture Capital Exits, at 1 (Working Paper, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=597441. 
181 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091.  The economies of scope mean “[a]n economic theory stating that 
the average total cost of production decreases as a result of increasing the number of different goods 
produced.”  INVESTOPEDIA, Economies of Scope, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesof 
scope.asp (last visited June 8, 2008).  
182 Smith, supra note 62, at 136.  
183 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 3 (explaining that, after the investment exit, VC “renews 
itself with the venture capitalist raising additional funds”). 
184 Id.  See also Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 387 (stating that “[t]wo central characteristics define 
the venture capital cycle: (1) the cycle takes place in reasonably well-defined stages; and (2) the cycle 
repeats itself once the final stage is completed”). 
185 See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 345 (arguing that the investment exit “is extremely 
important to the health of the other parts of the cycle”). 
186 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
187 “Typically, VCs are not engaged in only one IPO during their economic lifetime; typically they 
play a repeated game in the IPO market.”  Werner Neus & Uwe Walz, Exit Timing of Venture 
Capitalists in the Course of an Initial Public Offering, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 253, 259 (2005).  
Consequently, VC’s reputation achieved as a repeat player in the venture capital community plays an 
important role for a successful investment exit, especially an IPO.  See Vladimir I. Ivanov et al., IPOs 
and Venture Capital Reputation 34 (May 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American 
Finance Association) (arguing based on empirical evidence that “VC reputation has an economically 
and statistically significant association with the subsequent investment success of IPO issuers a VC 
backs”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910982. 
188 See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 387-88 (arguing that “[t]he cyclical nature of venture capital 
makes the reputation of the venture capital firm the crucial enforcement mechanism that takes the place 
of reliance on contractual duties imposed by default rules governing limited partnerships”). 
189 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091. 
190 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 3. 
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in a venture capital investment is closely linked to a phase of the cycle.191  The 
VC-investor relationship is established during the fund-raising process. 192   In 
addition, the VC fund-venture business relationship is structured during the 
investing process.193   The characteristics of each contractual relationship have 
direct influences on the behavior of every party of the venture capital contracts,194 
which plays a major role in the venture capital cycle.  All the provisions of one of 
the two contracts mentioned above interact with each other,195 the two contracts 
are correlated with each other,196 and each process of the whole venture capital 
cycle is interrelated. 197   These interrelationships and interactions enhance the 
economic efficiency of the venture capital contracts.198 
To sum up, the risky nature of venture capital investment has made its legal 
structure unique from other legal structures of conventional financing options.199  
The relationship among the key players in the venture capital market can be 
understood as a “two-step agency relationship,” 200  where VCs serve as 
intermediaries between outside investors and venture businesses as investees.201  
The two-step agency relationship consists of the VC-investor relationship and the 
VC fund-venture business relationship.202  Those relationships are governed by the 
terms of explicit and implicit contracts, which contain monitoring and incentive 
                                                          
191  The dual contractual structure of the venture capital investment 
can be better understood by seeing the two-step process of capital flow as 
shown in the figure “Overview of the Venture Capital Process” on the 
right side, which is excerpted from Gompers & Lerner’s “the venture 
capital cycle.”  Id. at 11.  
The figure should be understood as a simplified version of the 
venture capital process only describing cash and securities flow of the 
venture capital investment.  In practice, however, the venture capital 
process includes the exchange of venture capitalists’ services and 
company’s control rights and other implicit mechanisms.  Black & 
Gilson, supra note 6, at 252-64. 
 
 
192 See generally GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 23-154. 
193 See generally id. at 157-342. 
194 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 23 (emphasizing that “form influences behavior”). 
195 Fluck et al., supra note 75, at 1 (claiming that “the interaction between different provisions is 
not yet well understood”). 
196 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091-92 (explaining “Braiding of the Venture Capital Fund-Portfolio 
Company and the Investor-Venture Capital Fund Contracts”).    
197 GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 3-4. 
198 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091. 
199 See generally Gilson, supra note 7, at 1076-92; Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 252-64. 
200 Duffner, supra note 2, at 79. 
201 Id. 
202 Cf. Smith, supra note 62, at 136 (stating that “[a]t each of [venture capital process] stages, two 
relationships exert powerful, often countervailing, pressure on the parties: the relationship between 
investors and venture capitalists, and the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs”). 
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mechanisms.203  In the venture capital cycle, the mechanisms of one relationship 
interact with those of the other relationship.204  The interrelationship of the VC 
partnership agreement and the company investment agreement help to solve the 
intrinsic problems associated with the venture capital investment205 and increase 
the efficiency of the venture capital market.206  The theory of Professors Black and 
Gilson suggests that the economic efficiency of venture capital contracting should 
be supported by a reputation market and an exit market, especially the active IPO 
market.207 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL THEORY 
A. Venture Capital Market System as an Ecosystem 
The venture capital market system is a part of the business system.208  Some 
leading scholars draw analogies from a biological ecosystem 209  to describe a 
business system.210  Dr. James F. Moore defines the business ecosystem as “[a]n 
                                                          
203 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1078 (explaining basic characteristics of financial techniques used in the 
venture capital investment). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. (arguing that “braiding of the two relationships facilitates the resolution of problems internal 
to each”). 
206 “By braiding [Professor Gilson] mean[s] the fact that the structure of the two contracts are 
intertwined, each operating to provide an implicit term that supports the other, and thereby increasing 
the contractual efficiency of both.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
207 See id. at 1091-92.  When an investment exit is conducted through an IPO, the link is created 
between the venture capital market and the stock market.  Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 261; see 
also id. at 245 (stating that an investment exit market serves as “a functional link between private and 
public equity markets”).  The reputation market and the IPO market are interrelated because VCs’ 
reputation has a significant influence on the success of an IPO.  Ivanov et al., supra note 187, at 37.  
“Empirical studies suggest that firms backed by well-respected venture capitalists are able to sell shares 
to the public at higher prices than other firms.”  Smith, supra note 62, at 158 (citing Christopher B. 
Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence From the 
Going Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 464 (1990); William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, 
Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879 (1991)). 
208 See Esmond T. Goei, Venture Capital Ecosystem, ESMONDSAYS, MB-E, June 1, 2004, at 10 
(explaining that “[a]n industry is itself a part of a larger ecosystem that consists of many interrelated 
parts that may or may not be obvious”), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn6207/is_ 
20040601/ai_n24907657.  
209 It should, however, be pointed out that there are differences between natural and 
business ecosystems.  First of all, in business ecosystems the actors are intelligent 
and are capable of planning and seeing the future.  Second, business ecosystems 
compete over possible members.  Third, business ecosystems are aiming at 
delivering innovations, where natural ecosystems are aiming at pure survival. 
Mirva Peltoniemi & Elisa Vuori, Business Ecosystem as the New Approach to Complex Adaptive 
Business Environments, FRONTIERS OF E-BUSINESS RESEARCH 273 (e-Business Research Center, 2004) 
(citing MARCO IANSITI & ROY LEVIEN, THE KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE: WHAT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF 
BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS MEAN FOR STRATEGY, INNOVATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY 39 (2004)), 
available at http://www.ebrc.fi/kuvat/267-281_04.pdf. 
210 While some advocates for the business ecosystem model argue that the business ecosystem is 
just an analogy to the biological ecosystem, see Peltoniemi & Vuori, supra note 209, at 272 (citing 
JAMES F. MOORE, THE DEATH OF COMPETITION: LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY IN THE AGE OF BUSINESS 
ECOSYSTEMS 25-26 (HyperBusiness 1996)), the other proponents for the ecosystem model claim that 
the two systems “share some fundamental properties.”  Peltoniemi & Vuori, supra note 209, at 279 
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economic community supported by a foundation of interacting organizations and 
individuals – the organisms of the business world.”211  The business ecosystem 
theories have a short history and should be tested and evaluated more.212  The 
theories, however, are greatly applicable to the structure and dynamics of the 
venture capital market.   
Venture businesses have innovative ideas and enthusiastic venture 
entrepreneurs but typically lack management and marketing know-how,213 track 
records in the market, and collateral for loans.214   They need managerial and 
financial supports from VC funds.215  In addition to the supports of venture capital, 
for the promotion of the venture industry, venture businesses should be backed by 
infrastructures such as “a talent pool of knowledgeable professionals, . . . 
universities and research institutions, . . . a professional service infrastructure, . . . 
and customers and lead users of innovation.”216  Therefore, it is much harder for 
venture businesses to independently survive and grow than for traditional 
businesses to do so.  The incentive and monitoring structure, the explicit and 
implicit contracts, and the VC market players’ relationships are all interrelated and 
all the players in the market interact through the mechanisms.  The interconnection 
and interaction among venture businesses, private equity investors, and supporting 
infrastructure can be characterized as a venture business ecosystem.217  Through 
                                                          
(citing ROGER LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS 198 (MacMillan Publishing Co. 
1999)). A leading scholar who claims the latter’s theory asserts that “[b]iological ecosystems and 
economic systems are complex adaptive systems and thus follow the same deep laws.” MIRVA 
PELTONIEMI, BUSINESS ECOSYSTEM: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF AN ORGANISATION POPULATION FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVES OF COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION55 (Tampere U. of Tech. 2005) (citing Lewin, 
supra note 210, at 198), available at http://www.tut.fi/units/tuta/tita/tip/2004_reports/Peltoniemi_ 
business_ecosystem.pdf. 
211 MOORE, supra note 210, at 26. 
212 See Peltoniemi & Vuori, supra note 209, at 267. 
213 See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
NYU L. REV. 967, 968 (2006) (stating that "many of [venture startups] are founded by entrepreneurs 
with little business experience"). 
214 Triantis, supra note 126, at 309 (stating that start-ups "have too little of a track record to raise 
capital directly from investors in public markets"). 
215 See Gulinello, supra note 13, at 846 (explaining that venture capital develops the high-tech 
industry by providing venture businesses with comprehensive management and marketing services as 
well as financial resources). 
216 Andrew L. Zacharakis et al., The Development of Venture 
Capital-Backed Internet Companies: An Ecosystem Perspective, 
18 J. BUS. VENTURING 217, 220 (2003) (citing Homa Bahrami & 
Stuart Evans, Flexible Re-Cycling and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship, 37 CAL. MGMT.. REV. 62, 66-69 (1995)).  
The interaction of the components of the Silicon Valley 
ecosystem is illustrated with the following Figure.  Zacharakis et 
al., supra note 216, at 220 Fig.1. 
Fig. “Ecosystem perspective”  
 
217 See Peltoniemi & Vuori, supra note 209, at 273 (stating that “[f]eatures of a business ecosystem 
include fragmentation, interconnectedness, cooperation and competition” (citing MARCO IANSITI & 
ROY LEVIEN, THE KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE: WHAT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS 
MEAN FOR STRATEGY, INNOVATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY 35 (Harvard Business School Publishing 
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the conflicting and cooperative interrelationship,218 the key players of the venture 
capital market can enhance the market efficiency 219  and coevolve. 220   The 
ecosystem model is a conceptual tool for understanding the venture industry as a 
whole and developing a policy to promote venture businesses. 
B. Policy Implication 
In connection with the government’s policy for promoting venture 
businesses, the theories on venture capital cycle and contract suggest the 
following: 
First, the venture capital system should be considered as an interdependent 
organic ecosystem and the government’s policy should focus on nurturing the 
ecosystem.  The venture capital system is not “a simple, cyclical machine,”221 but 
an organic ecosystem which is spontaneous and complicated.222  Accordingly, it is 
inefficient for the government to directly control the venture industry through 
support and regulation.223  As for engineering the venture capital market, Professor 
Gilson emphasizes the government’s role of “passive investment in a highly 
incentivized intermediary,”224  for the spontaneous development of the venture 
business ecosystem.  Professor Gilson highlights the “simultaneous availability” of 
three key players of the venture capital market: VCs, venture investors, and 
venture entrepreneurs.225  He argues as follows: 
The government can act to induce the development of the necessary specialized 
financial intermediaries and also act to provide, in effect, seed capital, to the new 
market. That leaves the third factor necessary to solve the venture capital market 
simultaneity problem - entrepreneurs. Here the hypothesis is simply that the 
presence of a venture capital framework complete with funding will induce 
                                                          
Corporation 2008) (2004))). 
218 See Peltoniemi, supra note 210, at iii (stating that “[a]n organisation population is 
interconnected through competition and cooperation that can be present simultaneously”). 
219 “[T]he ability of the [market] participants to engage in private ordering” is essential for the 
market efficiency.  Gulinello, supra note 13, at 847. 
220 See MOORE, supra note 210, at 82 (stating that “[c]oevolution-in biology and in business-
proceeds by both competition and cooperation”). 
221 MICHAEL ROTHSCHILD, BIONOMICS: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPITALISM xiv (Beard Books 
1990). 
222 See id at xiv (arguing that “economies are spectacularly complex and endlessly adaptable”). 
223 “Investment organisations set up without the participation of private sector agents can only 
promote the temporary reduction of capital shortage; they cannot ensure the longer term development of 
the venture capital market, and may even act against it by exerting a crowding-out effect on the private 
sector.”  JUDIT KARSAI, CAN THE STATE REPLACE PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTORS? PUBLIC FINANCING OF 
VENTURE CAPITAL IN HUNGARY 13 (Inst. Of Econ. Hugarian Acad. of Sci.  2004), available at 
http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/dp/dp/mtdp0409.pdf.  See also ERNST & YOUNG, TRANSITION: GLOBAL 
VENTURE CAPITAL INSIGHTS REPORT 5 (Ernst & Young Global Ltd 2006) (pointing out the problems of 
the “[l]arge degree of control exercised by the central government in the venture ecosystem, resulting in 
disincentives for both entrepreneurs and investors”), available at http://www.ey.com/global/assets.nsf/ 
International/SGM_-_VC_-_Insight_-_May_2006/$file/EY_SGM_VC_Insight_Report_May2006.pdf. 
224 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1102. 
225 Id. at 1093. 
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entrepreneurs to reveal themselves.226  
Professor Gilson’s “simultaneity” theory may lead to the idea that, in order 
to promote venture businesses efficiently, the government should take the venture 
industry as an organic whole and “nurtur[e] the natural process of [the venture 
industry’s] growth.”227 
Second, the venture capital contract theory indicates that the efficient venture 
capital market is established by private ordering, 228 which is enforced by 
reputational sanction. 229   The success of the venture industry depends on the 
efficiency of the venture capital market, which is generated by market players’ 
efforts “to reduce their transaction costs”230 by private ordering.  As Professor 
Troy A. Paredes argues, the preconditions for the efficient private ordering are as 
follows: the parties in the market should 1) be sophisticated enough to comprehend 
the issues to be negotiated, 2) transact at low cost, and 3) be repeat players.231  In a 
developing economy, however, the capital market condition does not satisfy the 
requirements for private ordering.  Only the government, not the private sector, has 
the incentive to establish the infrastructural preconditions for successful private 
ordering. 232   The government can promote sophisticated negotiations among 
market participants by supporting educational institutions for venture capital 
experts, especially VCs as intermediaries between venture businesses and 
investors.233  The experience and sophistication of the venture capital experts can 
                                                          
226 Id. at 1094. 
227 ROTHSCHILD, supra note 221, at xv (arguing that the government should be “the astute 
cultivator of society’s economic ecosystem”). 
228 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  Cf. Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: 
A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 
79, 154 (1997) (arguing that “[b]y taking advantage of holes in the regulatory framework and by 
entering into creative agreements with management of the companies in which they invest, venture 
capital companies are able to gain potential, if not actual, control over their portfolio companies”).   
229 See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory 
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2328 (2004) (stating that “[t]he typical enforcement 
mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant 
community punishes parties in breach of contract by denying them future business”). 
230 Gulinello, supra note 13, at 847. 
231 Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. 
Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1109 (2004). 
Similarly but from different perspectives, as Professor Sanford J. Grossman suggested, the 
voluntary disclosure system based on private contracts should meet the following conditions: “1) 
investors know that firms have that information (for example, they know it has collected the level of 
revenues for that year); 2) firms cannot lie (albeit they can refuse to disclose their information); 3) 
disclosure is costless.”  See Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation 18 
(ECGI - Law, Working Paper No. 21/2004, 2004) (citing Sanford J. Grossman, The Information Roles 
of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981)), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=536682. 
232 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1094 (stating that “[n]o institution other than the government has the 
right incentive to invest in the public good that results from establishing a venture capital market”). 
233 See Paredes, supra note 231, at 1110-12 (emphasizing the role of intermediaries like 
“transaction cost engineers”) (citing Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984)). 
Cf. Hoe Hoon Chung, Lessons from the Korean Venture Industry Development, 30 (World Bank, 
Innovation Policy Work Background Paper, 2004) (stating that “in Korea the venture capitals only 
estimate the business and invest but don’t actually have the capacity to support the business or have 
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facilitate the standardization of private contracting and this standardization 
decreases transaction costs. 234   The government should not interfere with the 
incentive and monitoring mechanisms of venture capital contracting because it is 
likely to restrict private ordering and harm market efficiency.235 
Lastly and in line with the above-mentioned argument, it should be 
emphasized that active exit markets are an essential requirement for the efficient 
venture business ecosystem.  Through the exit route, venture capital can circulate 
actively. 236   The active venture capital cycle makes the market participants 
continuing players. 237   The continuing playing of market players creates the 
reputation market238 and enables the implicit mechanisms of the venture capital 
investment.239  Consequently, the existence of active investment exit routes is a 
prerequisite to a prosperous venture capital market.240  For developing countries, 
the establishment of active exit markets is important and challenging.241  Due to 
small and undiversified exit routes, many countries have been unsuccessful in the 
introduction of the U.S. model of the venture capital market.242  To promote a 
venture industry, therefore, the government’s policy should focus on the 
establishment of the infrastructure for the exit channels.243 
V. KOREAN POLICIES FOR PROMOTION OF VENTURE BUSINESSES 
A. Overview of Venture Policies in Korea  
The Korean economy has rapidly developed since the early 1960s and now 
faces two ways: growing into an advanced country or remaining as a developing 
country.244  Now is the time for the Korean economy to overcome the challenges 
                                                          
enough experience in it”), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/109280/ 
KoreaVenture_final.pdf. 
234 See Paredes, supra note 231, at 1113-14. 
235 See Gulinello, supra note 13, at 860 (stating that “any regulatory attempt to limit [market 
participants’] ability to engage in such private ordering could adversely affect the efficiency and 
prospects of the venture capital market”). 
236 See Wei Luo, The Exit of Venture Capital and Earnings Management in Newly-Public Firms, at 
3 n.1 (Presentation Paper at 2005 FMA Annual Meeting Program, Session No. 232, 2005), available at 
http://www.fma.org/Chicago/ChicagoProgram.htm (explaining the venture capital cycle). 
237 See supra notes 143 and 188. 
238 See supra note 140 (defining the repeat playing as one of the requirements for the efficient 
reputation market). 
239 See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 245 (arguing that “[t]he implicit contract over future 
control . . . is permitted by the availability of exit through an IPO”). 
240 Id. 
241 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 2 (arguing that “[t]he absence of viable exit mechanisms has 
been identified as one explanation for the difficulties developing countries have encountered in creating 
a venture capital industry”). 
242 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 245. 
243 See Gulinello, supra note 13, at 878 (arguing that the Taiwanese “government efforts to stabilize 
the domestic securities market and liberalize listing for emerging and entrepreneurial companies 
attracted private-sector investment in the venture capital market by creating a potential avenue for 
investment exit”). 
244 Korea rose from the ashes of the [Korean] war, and, in 30-40 years, rose from being 
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to joining the ranks of the developed countries.245  As Korea is not blessed with 
natural resources, the Korean economy suffers from the recent global trend of high 
raw material prices. 246   Also, high labor costs restrict the development of 
traditional businesses in Korea.247  The Korean economy’s strength lies in “large 
investment in R&D and education.”248   Consequently, knowledge-based small 
venture businesses, as agents of innovation, should serve as a major engine for 
future economic growth in Korea.249  In this respect, the Korean government’s 
policy to promote the venture industry aims not only to develop the hi-tech SME 
sector but to restructure the Korean economy into a “knowledge-based”250 one.251 
                                                          
one of the world’s poorest countries to entering the ranks of the OECD - the 
group of the world’s richest nations. For example, per capita income increased 
157 times, from $67 in 1953 to $10,543 in 1996. Korea was the envy of much of 
the world and a role model to underdeveloped countries. 
Dong-gull Lee, Toward a Post-Crisis Vision for Financial Sector, THE KOREA HERALD, March 31, 
2008; see also Marcus Noland, South Korea’s Experience with International Capital Flows 4-6 (Inst. 
for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 05-4, 2005) (explaining the historical context of the Korean 
economy), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=759646; Randall Jones, Creating a Knowledge-Based 
Economy in Korea, THE KOREA HERALD, March 11, 2008 (stating that “[r]apid economic development 
has increased Korea’s per capita income from only 20 percent of the OECD average in 1970 to nearly 
70 percent by 2006, boosting Korea to 23rd among the 30 OECD countries”); THE WORLD BANK, 
KOREA AS A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AND LESSONS LEARNED 1 (World 
Bank 2006), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/ 
KFDLP/0,,contentMDK:20997709~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1727232~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884
~theSitePK:461198,00.html.  
245  Some challenges are the results of the side effects of the government-driven policy to rapidly 
develop the Korean economy.  One important side effect caused by the policy is “a dualistic economy 
divided between a highly competitive, export-oriented manufacturing sector and a much less dynamic 
domestic demand oriented sector.”  Jones, supra note 244.  For an explanation of “challenges to 
Korea’s future development,” see CARL J. DAHLMAN & THOMAS ANDERSSON, KOREA AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: MAKING THE TRANSITION 28-31(World Bank Publications, 2001); 
The World Bank, Overview, supra note 244, at 31-33 (explaining challenges for a knowledge 
economy). 
246  See Soh-jung Yoo, Raw Materials Prices Continue to Surge, THE KOREA HERALD, Jan. 15, 
2008; The Rising Cost of Nature, THE KOREA HERALD, Sep. 22, 2007 (reporting that “[a] fundamental 
global trend nowadays is growing natural resource scarcity”). 
247  Cf. Jones, supra note 244 (stating that “[d]espite growing competition, Korea has considerable 
scope to raise labor productivity, which was 60 percent below the U.S. level in 2006”); Ji-hyun Cho, 
President Warns against Hardline Labor Unions, THE KOREA HERALD, March 14, 2008 (stating that 
“Foreign-invested companies here listed high labor costs as the biggest obstacle in establishing or 
expanding businesses in Korea, according to a recent poll conducted by the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry”); see Gilson, supra note 7, at 1068 (arguing that “[a]t a time when developing 
countries are increasingly losing manufacturing jobs to low wage countries, and when low wage 
countries seek industries that depend on more than just cheap labor, creating a venture capital market 
has become the holy grail of economic development”). 
248 Jones, supra note 244; see also Chung, supra note 233, at 2 (arguing that “the continuous 
investment of Korean society in education and technology development during the past 30 years was 
another key factor that accelerated the growth of startup firms and their development”); The World 
Bank, Overview, supra note 244, at 8-19. 
249 See Lee, supra note 8, at 489 (stating that “[s]mall firms have played an important role in 
technological innovation and economic growth in developed countries”). 
250 According to the OECD definition, knowledge-based economies mean “economies which are 
directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information.”  DAHLMAN & 
ANDERSSON, supra note 245, at 31.  For a detailed explanation of the “concept of a knowledge-based 
economy,” see id. at 31-32; see also Jones, supra note 244 (maintaining that “[c]reating a knowledge-
based economy is key to sustaining high growth rates in Korea and boosting income levels to those in 
the leading OECD countries”). 
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The history of venture policies in Korea can be generally divided into the 
following three eras: “Quickening Era,” “Infrastructure Expansion Era,” and 
“Adjustment Era.”252  The details of each era are shown in the following Figure 3. 
Figure 3: History of Venture Policies in Korea253 
  Before 1997: Era of Quickening Venture Industry 
 1. Enactment of the Support for Small and Medium Enterprise Establishment 
Act (1986) 
 2. Enactment of the Financial Assistance to New Technology Business Act 
(1986) 
 3. Establishment of the KOSDAQ Market (1996) 
 ĺ  The advent of the first generation of venture businesses owing to the 
construction of the legal infrastructure 
 
 
 
  1997-2001 : Era of Promotion for Venture Business Inauguration and Expansion of 
Venture Infrastructure 
 1. Establishment of the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture 
Businesses (1997) 
 2. Preferential Tax Policy for Venture Businesses (1998) 
 3. Activation Plan for the KOSDAQ Market (1998) 
 4. Investment Support for Start-Up Investment Company (1999) 
  ĺ  Explosive Growth of Venture Industry along with Expansion of IT Industry 
 
 
 
  After 2002 : Era of Adjustment to Ensure Substantiality of Venture Businesses 
 1. Reinforcement of the Venture business certification system (2002) 
 2. Improvement of Transparency of Venture Capital (2003) 
 3. Strengthening of the KOSDAQ’s Delisting Criteria (2003) 
 4. Measure for the Activation of Venture Businesses (2004)* 
 5. Plan for the Advancement of Venture Capital (2006)* 
 6. Revision of the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture 
Businesses (2007)* 
                                                          
251 Chung, supra note 233, at 2. 
252 MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMY ET AL., ⻺㻮₆㠛 䢲㎇䢪╖㺛 [MEASURE FOR THE 
ACTIVATION OF VENTURE BUSINESSES], Agenda of Economy-Related Ministers’ Meeting 3 (2004), 
available at http://mofe.go.kr/division/br_pc/br_pc_03.php?action=view&field=&keyword=&page= 
52&t_code=500&no=59195. 
253  This figure is a translated version of a chart of “Development of Venture Policies” in “Measure 
for the Activation of Venture Businesses.”  Id.  Star marked parts are added to the original chart. 
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  (The expiration date of the Act became extended from Dec. 31, 2007 to Dec. 
31, 2017) 
  ĺ  Assurance of Transparency and Guidance for Soft Landing of Venture 
Industry 
 
Since the enactment of the Support for Small and Medium Enterprise 
Establishment Act in 1986, 254  the Korean government has promoted venture 
businesses in various direct ways, such as providing direct financing,255 giving tax 
benefits,256 and lifting regulatory restrictions.257  During the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997-1998, 258  the Korean government strongly acknowledged the venture 
businesses as a driving force for the revival of the Korean economy.259  Then, the 
government reinforced the policies for encouraging high-tech venture start-ups 
based on new legislations.260  The government-driven policy primarily consisted of 
the government’s direct support and regulation of venture businesses.261  Owing to 
                                                          
254 Not until 1986…did Korea provide the institutional infrastructure for the venture 
capital industry. In 1986 Korea enacted several laws related to venture capital, 
including the Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companies and the Law 
to Assist the Financing of New Technology Ventures. After these laws were 
enacted, the industry grew rather quickly. 
Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 468. 
255 See Suk-young Lee, Korea's Policy Measures on SMEs and the Changing Environment - 
Korea's Experience in Fostering Venture Enterprises, at 4 (Presentation Paper at APEC 9th Meeting of 
Ministers Responsible for SMEs, 2002), available at http://www.apec.org/apec/documents_reports/ 
small_medium_enterprises_ministerial_meetings/2002.MedialibDownload.v1.html?url=/etc/medialib/a
pec_media_library/downloads/ministerial/sectoral/smemm/2002.Par.0009.File.v1.1. 
256 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 458 (stating that “the Korean government is playing a more 
active role in its venture capital market by providing tax-subsidy incentives for eligible companies”).  
257 See Lee, supra note 255, at 3. 
258 See The World Bank, supra note 244, at 7 (pointing out that excessive governmental 
intervention and weak private financial sectors caused the financial crisis). 
259 “Since the Asian financial crisis in late 1997, venture businesses have been praised as a de facto 
alternative to rebound the economy.” Venture Cos. Chart Ethics Codes Amid Mounting Scandals, THE 
KOREA TIMES, January 18, 2002. Before the Asian financial crisis, “[t]here had been several 
initiatives by previous Korean governments to promote small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
However, the support for SMEs through the subsidisation of ‘venture business’ and of venture capital 
by the Kim Dae-Jung government after the financial crisis is unprecedented in several respects.”  JANG-
SUP SHIN & HA-JOON CHANG, RESTRUCTURING ‘KOREA, INC.’: FINANCIAL CRISIS, CORPORATE 
REFORM, AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION 109 (ROUTLEDGECURZON STUDIES IN THE GROWTH 
ECONOMIES IN ASIA, 2003). 
260 As well as the Venture Promotion Act, the new legislations include “the Law for the Assistance 
of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Start-up (LASMES), the Law for the Financial Assistance to 
New Technology Enterprises (LFANTE), the Finance Business Specialised in Lending Law (FBSLL) 
and the Law on Limitation of Special Tax Treatment (LLSTT).”  Young-Cheol Jeong, Korea Venture 
Business, Venture Capital and KOSDAQ (Woo, Yun, Kang, Jeong & Han, 2001), available at 
http://www.altassets.com/casefor/countries/2001/nz2846.php. 
261 [A]n unprecedented amount of public money was poured into supporting venture 
business. The government launched the 100-billion-won Korea Venture 
Investment Fund with co-investment by foreign investors in 1999. Public funds 
spent in supporting the establishment of new SMEs, mainly in the form of 
investing in or lending to venture capital and venture companies, increased by 36 
times from 34.4 billion won ($28.7 million) in 1997 to 1,237 billion won 
($1,030.8 million) in 1999 (SMBA website). 
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the government’s active involvement, the venture industry in Korea had grown fast 
in quantity and size until 2001.262  However, the Korean government failed to 
change the economic structure of Korea from a conglomerate-oriented structure to 
a venture SME-based one.263  In addition, the government-led policy caused many 
side effects such as “inefficient allocation of economic resources,” 264  “moral 
hazards of venture businesses,” 265  and “inefficient market entry and exit.” 266  
These side effects, combined with the IT boom that was artificially promoted by 
the government, exacerbated the dot.com bubble until the second half of 2000.267  
As a result, when the world-wide IT bubble burst in mid-2000, the KOSDAQ 
market collapsed268  on a much larger scale than the NASDAQ market did.269  
Thereafter, a series of financial scandals involving venture businessmen broke 
out. 270   The financial scandals undermined the market integrity and investor 
confidence in the KOSDAQ.  Consequently, the KOSDAQ market became 
sluggish until the middle of 2004.271 
Experiencing the side effects of the government-driven policy such as 
                                                          
SHIN & CHANG, supra note 259, at 109. 
262 “The number of venture businesses in Korea rose above 10 thousands in 2001 . . . . The 
KOSDAQ Composite Index hit the historic high by increasing 3.4 times in a year in 2000 . . . . The 
number of centers for business incubation had increased from 30 centers in 1998 to 293 centers in 
2002.”  YOON-CHUL LIM ET AL., “㌞⪲㤊 ₆㑶㰧㟓㩗 㭧㏢₆㠛(⻺㻮) 㩫㺛 ⹲Ὴ 㡆ῂ” [A 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE POLICY DEVELOPMENT FOR TECHNOLOGY BASED FIRM(VENTURE FIRM] 21 
(Science and Technology Policy Institute) (translated from Korean to English), available at 
http://www.stepi.re.kr/ResearchPub/Fulltext/F05-01.pdf. 
263 “The share of SMEs’ contribution to manufacturing production increased only by 1 per cent 
from 46.3 per cent in 1997 to 47.3 per cent in 2000 (SMBA website).  The Korean economy is still 
dominated by large companies, as it has always been for the last few decades.”  SHIN & CHANG, supra 
note 259, at 111. 
264 Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., supra note 252, at 2 (translated from Korean to 
English). 
265 Id. (translated from Korean to English). 
266 Id. (translated from Korean to English). 
267 SHIN & CHANG, supra note 259, at 111 (stating that “the attempt to achieve [the establishment of 
the vibrant SME sector] overnight led to a huge bubble in the KOSDAQ market”) (emphasis added). 
268 On March 10, 2000, the electronic board displaying stock prices at the Kosdaq 
market was filled with red figures, meaning that the prices rose from the previous 
day. The market closed the day at 2834.4 points, a record high. On the following 
Monday, however, the Kosdaq index dropped by 39 points, showing a sign of 
unease. The unease drove small investors into a state of panic. 
On March 17, the stock price index shed 159 points from the previous day. On 
March 20, the price index plummeted further by 187 points. 
The Kosdaq index continued to take a beating, and eventually came to at 525.80, 
following an endless series of downturns. 
And so the bubble had burst. The sharp decline in the Kosdaq index forced 
venture businesses into a corner. 
Moon-sool Cho, Venture Businesses Nosedive as Bubble Bursts, THE KOREA HERALD, March 2, 2007. 
269 See supra Figure 1 at 108. 
270 “At the time, venture businessmen were regarded as conmen in the market. Even institutional 
investors and venture investment companies, not to mention angel investors, turned their back on the 
[venture investment] market.”  Cho, supra note 268. 
271 After the IT bubble was bursted in early 2000, the KOSDAQ market index “crashed to a 
[historical] low of 324.71 on August 4, 2004.”  S Korea’s KOSDAQ Market to Celebrate 10th 
Anniversary on July 1, ASIA PULSE, June 20, 2006. 
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“failure in substantial and profitable growth, formalism in the support of 
technology innovation and commercialization, and lack of policy 
diversification,” 272  the Korean government seemed to realize that the existing 
policy focusing on the numerical or quantitative growth should be changed into a 
market-oriented policy for the substantial growth of venture businesses.  Since 
2002, the Korean government has modified the venture business policy to 
guarantee the sustainable development of venture industry.273  As for important 
new policies, the government announced “Measure for the Activation of Venture 
Businesses”274 in 2004 and “Plan for the Advancement of Venture Capital”275 in 
2006, which are intended for nurturing the venture business ecosystem.276  The 
new policy aimed to establish an infrastructure suitable for the characteristics of 
venture businesses and enhance the capacity of the capital market.277  After the 
new policy was adopted, the number of venture enterprises and the amount of 
venture capital investment began increasing and the KOSDAQ composite index 
started to rise.278   
                                                          
272 Lim et al., supra note 262, at 1. 
273 In 2002 and 2003, the Korean government announced two major plans: “Plan for Reforming the 
Venture Capital System to Activate the Venture Investment Market” (2002) and “Plan for Promoting 
M&As of Venture Businesses” (2003). 
The major contents of the former plan are “creation of the secondary market to accelerate venture 
investment exit,” “improvement of government’s investment for venture businesses [indirect investment 
through] fund of funds,” and “introduction of new system of venture capital taking the form of limited 
liability company.”  Id. at 9 (translated from Korean to English). 
The major contents of the latter plan include “removal of obstacles to M&As and simplification of 
the process,” “creation of environment where it is easy to swap stocks,” “improvement of role and 
function of existing M&A funds,” and “strengthening functions of intermediary and evaluation of 
venture businesses for M&As.”  Id. at 10 (translated from Korean to English). 
274 Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., supra note 252.  The “Measure for the Activation of 
Venture Businesses” is a detailed plan of the “Comprehensive Measure for Enhancement of the 
Competitiveness of SMEs” announced on July 7, 2004 that includes a supportive measure for 
innovative venture SMEs.  Id. at 4; see also Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., “㭧㏢₆㠛 
ἓ㨗⩻ṫ䢪 㫛䞿╖㺛” [Comprehensive Measure for Enhancement of the Competitiveness of SMEs], 
2004, available at http://www.mofe.go.kr/public/info14_2_3.php?action=view&t_code=741&no= 
82107. 
The major contents of the “Measure for the Activation of Venture Businesses” include “activation 
of the KOSDAQ,” “reform of a quotation system,” “increase in guarantees for venture businesses,” 
“promoting information circulation among venture businesses,” “encouraging expansion of venture 
investment,” and “preparing a good environment for revival of failed venture businesses.” Lim et al., 
supra note 262, at 10 (translated from Korean to English). 
275 Small and Medium Business Administration, Plan for the Advancement, supra note 12. 
276 See Lim et al., supra note 262, at 12 (stating that “[s]ince the burst of the IT bubble, it became a 
policy issue to nurture an ecosystem for venture businesses overcoming the growth in quantity and size 
. . . .”). 
277 Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., supra note 252, at 4. 
278 First of all, the number of venture businesses started to increase. Their number had 
continued to decrease, from 11,392 in 2001 to 7,967 in 2004. Following the 
announcement of the new policy, the number showed a drastic increase again, 
from 9,732 in 2005 to 12,218 in 2006. The Kosdaq index went up to a level 
higher than 380 by the end of 2004, after recording the lowest level of 324.71 on 
Aug. 4 that year. The 1 trillion-won parent fund, which was the core of the New 
Venture Policy, breathed life into venture businesses. The amount of the newly 
invested venture capital started to increase to 757.3 billion won in 2005 and 
733.3 billion won in 2006, which is about 20 percent increase from the 2002-
2004 period. The Kosdaq index jumped to 750 in 2005 on the back of the new 
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Since 1997, the government-driven policy has achieved the external growth 
of the venture industry. 279   There has been a numerical increase of venture 
businesses280 and the growth of the venture business sector created more jobs.281  
However, it is doubtful that the increased venture enterprises have cost-effectively 
contributed to the substantial growth of the Korean economy282 and successfully 
                                                          
measures, including permission for venture capital to control management, 
invigoration of PEF (private equity fund), and more stringent supervision of 
venture investment businesses. 
Moon-sool Cho, [10 years after Crisis] Venture Businesses Revived on Government Support, THE 
KOREA HERALD, March 5, 2007. 
279 See Chae-Yoon Lim et al., “䞲ῃ䡫 ⻺㻮㌳䌲Ἒ 䢲㎇䢪 ⹿㞞” [Policy Recommendation for 
Promoting Korean Venture Ecosystem], Science and Technology Policy Institute, 2006, p 175 (stating 
that “[e]ven though we cannot assert that the external growth is totally attributable to the venture policy, 
we cannot deny that the venture policy has got much influence and effect on the growth”) (translated 
from Korean to English), available at http://www.stepi.re.kr/researchpub/fulltext/P06-01.pdf. 
280 The following Figure shows the rise and fall of the number of venture businesses during the 
period of 1998-2007. 
 
Source: http://www.venturein.or.kr/. KCCI, supra note 21, at 2. 
* The number of venture businesses as of the end of April 2008 is 14,385; see VEBTURE-in, 
http://www.venturein.or.kr (last visited June 8, 2008). 
Recent statistics say that, for the last 10 years, the annual number of new start-
ups in the manufacturing sector has increased by about 2.4 times from 21,831 
companies in 1997 to 52,587 companies in 2005; the annual number of new 
venture start-ups has risen by two times from 50 companies to 100 companies; 
and the annual average amount of investment has grown by seven times from 90 
billion won to 600 billion won. 
Lim et al., supra note 279, at 175 (translated from Korean to English). 
281 The number of the employees in the venture business sector has increased from 75,000 in 1998 
to 339,000 in 2005 - the average annual increase rate was 23.9%.  During the same period, the average 
annual increase rate of the number of the employees in the conglomerate sector was 5.8%.  KCCI, 
supra note 21, at 4. 
282 According to the current law of venture business, any enterprise including small-
medium sized companies can register as venture business as long as it meets all 
the requirement. For that reason, it is hard to say that the quantitative increase in 
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restructured the Korean economy. 283   Also, it is doubtful that the numerical 
increase of venture businesses means they are competitive.  According to the 
statistics of the Small and Medium Business Administration, “the proportion of 
venture businesses in the total annual exports in Korea has been decreasing.”284  
Now, the Korean venture industry faces many challenges in promoting the 
substantial growth. 
The distinctive characteristic of the Korean venture policy is that the Korean 
government takes direct measures to promote the venture industry by providing 
financial supports, tax benefits, and preferential regulatory treatments to 
government-certified venture businesses.  The governmental policy is legally based 
on the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses.285  
Along with the KOSDAQ market, the Venture Promotion Act has served to 
establish the framework of the Korean venture ecosystem. 286   The Venture 
Promotion Act shows that the government’s policy for venture businesses is 
basically planned-economic, not market-based.  The Act sets the scope of its 
supports and regulations by artificially defining venture business and gives 
preferential benefits only to companies that fall into the statutory category.287  The 
government’s excessive supports for certified venture businesses make the 
businesses less risky.288  And the limited chances for investment exit cause the 
venture capital investment to be less profitable.289  As a result of the governmental 
policy combined with inefficient exit markets, the Korean venture business shows 
                                                          
venture businesses in Korea has brought up the real development of venture 
businesses. 
Chung, supra note 233, at 27. 
283 See SHIN & CHANG, supra note 259, at 111 (maintaining that “it is still far from certain whether 
the Korean government has succeeded in turning the SME sector into an alternative engine of growth”). 
284 KCCI, supra note 21, at 3 (translated from Korean to English). 
The following table shows percentages of total exports by each enterprise sector: 
Classification ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 
’07. 1-
5 
Large Enterprises 57.0 57.9 57.8 64.3 67.5 67.9 67.0 
SMEs 42.9 42.0 42.1 35.6 32.4 32.0 32.9 
Venture Enterprises 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 
The Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration 
Id. (quoted table translated from Korean to English). 
285 When the legislation was enacted in 1997, the Act was intended to be in force only for a ten-year 
period. However, the effective period of the law was extended to Dec. 31, 2017.  See Supplementary 
Provision of the Venture Promotion Act § 2 (2007).  
286 See Lim et al., supra note 279, at 91-92 (stating that since the establishment of the KOSDAQ 
market and the enactment of the Venture Promotion Act, the framework of the Korean venture 
ecosystem, which consists of venture businesses, venture capitals and exit markets, has started to be 
shaped). 
287 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying texts. 
288 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 459 (stating that the Venture Promotion Act “protects 
entrepreneurs from downside risks”). 
289 See id. (stating that “the lack of a properly functioning equity market for venture capital hinders 
the realization of upside potential for investors”). 
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the feature of “limited-risk and limited-return.”290 
B. Problems Concerning Korean Venture Policies 
The Korean policy for the promotion of venture businesses was intended to 
follow the success story of the U.S. venture industry,291 which is based on active 
stock markets and “an extremely effective contracting structure that covers the 
entire venture capital cycle.”292  The policy goal of the Korean venture capital 
advancement plan is “the expansion of infrastructure for private sector leading 
venture investment in order to establish a market-based venture ecosystem.”293  
Still, the Korean government’s key policy measures are direct support and 
regulation based on the venture certification system.  The main problem of the 
Korean venture promotion policy is the contradiction between the policy goal and 
policy measures.294 
The contradiction between the policy goal and the methods is caused by the 
“status quo bias” 295  of policy makers in Korea. 296   Since 1960s, the Korean 
economy has grown remarkably, thanks to the government-driven economic 
policy.297  For rapid growth, the economic development strategy of the Korean 
government focused on major conglomerates, so-called chaebol,298 not small and 
                                                          
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 470 (stating that “Korea’s legislative history indicates that, through the enactment of the 
SLPVCC, the Korean government strove to emulate the success of the United States’ venture capital 
system”) (citing Jin Hyung Kim, Explanation on Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, 
Venture Capital, Fall 1997, at 2-3). Cf. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1068 (stating that “[i]t is hardly 
surprising, then, that other countries have sought to emulate American success in developing an 
effective venture capital market”). 
292 Id. at 1093. 
293 Small and Medium Business Administration, supra note 12, at 1 (translated from Korean to 
English). 
294 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 477 (maintaining that “if the underlining purpose of the 
[Venture Promotion Act] is to emulate the success of the United States’ venture capital industry simply 
through the relaxation of existing laws in Korea, the measures taken thus far are inadequate and other 
complementary measures are needed”). 
295 “The so-called status quo bias posits a systematic decisionmaking bias pursuant to which actors 
favor maintaining the status quo rather than switching to some alternative state. The status quo bias can 
lead to market failure where decisionmakers’ preference for the status quo perpetuates suboptimal 
practices.”  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1023, 1043-44 (2000) (emphasis changed). 
296 Cf. Gulinello, supra note 13, at 846 (stating that “nations seeking to create venture capital 
markets . . . may encounter certain historical, political, economic, and legal path dependencies that 
serve as obstacles to the organic development of a venture capital market”). 
297 South Korean economic performance over the last four decades has been nothing 
short of spectacular. During this period the country experienced only two years of 
negative growth: 1980, in the wake of the second oil shock and the assassination 
of President Park Chung-hee, and 1998, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. 
Noland, supra note 244, at 2; see also supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
298 The definition of the chaebol is still debatable. In general, to call an entity a 
“chaebol,” three requirements should be met: it must be (1) a conglomerate, (2) 
family controlled and (3) have a substantial proportion in the national economy. 
Jeong-Pyo Choi, The Theory and the Reality of the Korean Chaebol 6-7 (2004). 
Meanwhile, Dokjeom Gyuje Mit Gongjeong Georaee Gwanhan Beobryul 
[Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act] [hereinafter, MRFTA] uses the term 
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medium-sized companies.299  As the numbers of the conglomerates are relatively 
few, the government officers could effectively support the large enterprises 
intensively and preferentially.  The government established a bank-centered system 
to financially assist the conglomerates through the banks,300 which were controlled 
by the government.  The long-time tradition of the bank-centered301 and planned 
                                                          
“enterprise group,” instead of the term chaebol, which is defined as a group of 
companies whose businesses are substantially controlled by an individual or a 
company (MRFTA, art. 2 (2)). Indeed, most Korean chaebols belong to the 
enterprise group. 
Jeong Seo, Who will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebols’s Corporate Governance, 14 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2006). 
299 Lee, supra note 244 (explaining that “[d]uring the 1960s and 1970s in Korea, strategic industries 
were designated for preferential treatment, and conglomerates, known as chaebol, solidified their 
growth trajectories by exploiting their exclusive business licenses”).  As a result of the economic 
development policy favoring major conglomerates and the bank-centered financial system, “[s]maller 
firms suffered from a credit crunch, due to a lack of assets to use as loan collateral, the 
undercapitalisation of banks and an almost complete absence of equity capital.”  Baygan, supra note 9, 
at 14.  
300 Lee, supra note 244 (stating that “[t]he government constructed a bank-oriented indirect 
financial system, under which financial resources were allocated to industries, and firms were chosen 
by the government”); see also Baygan, supra note 9, at 14 (stating that “[t]he chaebol relied heavily on 
debt finance to fund their investment programmes which resulted in exceptionally high debt-equity 
ratios throughout the Korean industrial sector”). 
301 Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean financial system has been transforming from a 
bank-centered system to a capital-market system.  Cf. National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 
(Issue Spotlight: The Entry of Foreign Capital into the Domestic Market) (stating that, “[i]n 1997, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) pointed out that Korea’s 1997 foreign exchange crisis was caused 
by its bank-centered economic structure and unsound corporate management”), http://korea.assembly. 
go.kr/abo/zin_read.jsp?cha=1&boarditemid=1000000582 (last visited June 8, 2008).  However, the 
current Korean financial system should be changed towards a more capital market oriented system.  The 
following chart shows the current financial structure of Korea: 
 
Kim, supra note 331, at 5. 
Cf. As for the debate on bank-centered vs. stock market-based capital markets, Professors Black & 
Gilson states as follows: 
Advocates of bank-centered capital markets claim that this structure fosters 
patient capital markets and long-term planning, while a stock market-centered 
capital market is said to encourage short-term expectations by investors and 
responsive short-term strategies by managers (e.g., Edwards and Fischer, 1994; 
Porter, 1992). Advocates of stock market-centered systems (e.g., Gilson. 1996) 
stress the adaptive features of a market for corporate control which are lacking in 
bank-centered systems, and the lack of empirical evidence of short-termism. 
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economic policy is still affecting the venture policy making.   
In the “Measure for the Activation of Venture Businesses” in 2004, the 
Korean government rightly pointed out the problems caused by the government’s 
direct promotion policy as follows: 
Ƒ The direct governmental involvement and the lack of the venture business 
evaluation system based on the market mechanism have caused inefficient 
allocation of resources and moral hazards of venture businesses. 
ż The direct governmental support has checked the free [market] entry and exit [of 
venture businesses]. 
. . . . 
ż The regulatory capacity of the KOSDAQ market could not catch up with the 
rapid growth of the market and thus investor protection in the KOSDAQ became 
unsatisfactory resulting in low investor confidence.302  
Responding to the problems, the new policy aims to “[s]trengthen the 
functions of the infrastructure and the capital market meeting the demands of a 
venture start-up, in accordance with each development stage of the company’s life 
cycle consisting of a start-up stage, a growth stage, and a restructuring stage”303  
The major points of the new policy according to the life cycle model are as 
follows: 
1. Start-Up Stage 
ż Reinforcement of the investment capabilities of venture capitals, such as start-up 
investment companies and venture investment partnerships, which support venture 
start-ups  
ż Constructing a revival series for honest but failed venture businesses and 
formulating the system to share success and failure experiences 
2. Growth Stage 
ż In order for stable growth of venture businesses, taking measures to improve the 
demand bases, such as financial support, industrial-educational cooperation, and 
public purchase 
3. Mature · Restructuring Stage 
                                                          
Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 244. 
302 Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., supra note 252, at 2 (alteration in original) (translated 
from Korean to English). 
303 Id. at 4 (translated from Korean to English). 
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ż Recovering investor confidence by activating the KOSDAQ market and [Free 
Board] (non-KOSDAQ OTC market) and facilitating early exit of ailing companies 
from the markets  
ż Relaxation of the regulation on M&As among venture enterprises304  
The new policy includes some market-based measures.  For example, 
measures “to expand investment by the private sector through fund raising 
activities,” 305  “to deregulate on the establishment and operation of start-up 
investment companies,” 306  and “to establish the information infrastructure 
concerning venture businesses” 307  are all market-friendly.  However, the 
government’s policy is still based on the venture certification system, which is the 
core of the Venture Promotion Act.  When the Act was enacted in 1997, it was 
intended to be in force only for a ten-year period.  But the effective period of the 
Act was extended to December 31, 2017. 308   The extension shows the 
government’s willingness to continue actively patronizing the Korean venture 
businesses from cradle to grave.309 
The Korean government’s venture promotion policy is focused on directly 
supporting venture businesses, not the venture capital market.  Venture businesses, 
by nature, require environmental supports, which are infrastructures for efficient 
venture capital mechanisms.  The efficient contractual mechanisms are a necessary 
condition for the success of a venture capital market. 310   As the Korean 
government admitted, active governmental interference with the venture industry 
brought about an “inefficient allocation of resources and moral hazards of venture 
businesses”311 by distorting the contractual mechanisms.  The government’s direct 
promotion policy checks the development of the characteristics of efficient venture 
                                                          
304 Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (translated from Korean to English). 
305 Id. at 7 (translated from Korean to English).  For that purpose, the government made the Korea 
Development Bank creating a two-hundred-billion Korean won (approximately two hundred million 
dollar) size joint investment fund with private investors.  Id.  
306 Id. at 8 (translated from Korean to English).  The major contents of the deregulation measure are 
1) “relaxation of requirements for the establishment of the company, concerning paid-in capital amount 
. . . and securing professionals . . . ” and 2) “permitting a start-up investment company to operate a 
consulting business on the side in order to meet various financial demands of venture businesses and 
strengthen business support services.”  Id. (translated from Korean to English). 
307 Id. at 10.  The measure to establish the information infrastructure is “to provide trustful 
information for investment decision and enhances the transparency of the management by expanding 
the disclosure of business information on operation, finance, and technology of venture businesses.”  Id. 
(translated from Korean to English). 
308 See the Supplementary Provision of the Venture Promotion Act § 2 (2007).  
309 See infra note 315.  
Cf. The Korean government saves “honest” venture entrepreneurs from the grave through the 
Revival Program.  The Program gives governmental guarantees to failed entrepreneurs through the 
process, where “Korea Venture Business Association tests the morality of a qualified candidate who 
successfully recovered his or her credit, and then an insurance agency studies the technology and 
business feasibility.”  Ministry of Finance and Economy et al., supra note 252, at 9 (translated from 
Korean to English).  The government takes entrepreneurs’ know-hows and experiences as valuable 
social assets.  See id. 
310 See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
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capital relationships: the combination of strong incentive and monitoring, the 
combination of explicit and implicit contracts, and the combination of the VC-
investor relationship and the VC fund-venture business relationship.312 
As for the combination of strong incentive and monitoring, the governmental 
policy weakens incentive mechanisms and increases monitoring costs incurred by 
the private venture business sector.  The bureaucratic definition and preferential 
treatment for government-certified companies prevent venture entrepreneurs from 
being rationally incentivized according to a reasonable cost-benefit analysis (“B/C 
analysis”).313  Suppose that a venture entrepreneur reasonably analyzes the costs 
and benefits of various business forms and concludes that a form of business 
organization that is out of the statutory category of the Venture Promotion Act is 
the most suitable for his business.  If the benefits of being a government-certified 
venture enterprise are greater than the costs of giving up the suitable form, the 
entrepreneurs will choose a statutory form of venture business, irrespective of the 
rational B/C analysis.314  In Korea, for small venture start-ups, the governmental 
supports are a considerable factor for business planning.  The government’s direct 
promotion policy based on the venture certification system serves as an additional 
benefit in the B/C analysis of venture entrepreneurs and impedes efficient 
incentive and monitoring mechanisms by distorting reasonable B/C analysis by 
venture entrepreneurs.315  It encourages incapable entrepreneurs with poor business 
models to launch their businesses in order to receive governmental benefits,316 
which will lead to a situation ruled by “Gresham’s law.”317  The increased number 
of incompetent venture businesses raises monitoring and screening costs incurred 
                                                          
312 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
313 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 471-77. 
314 Id. at 472 (taking an example of the problem caused by “the specificity in defining a venture 
capital-backed company”). 
315 Cf. Gulinello, supra note 13, at 882 (arguing that “the Taiwan experience reinforces an 
important point made by Professor Gilson: the government must structure its engineering efforts to 
ensure the participants in the market have sufficient incentives to select and monitor investments”). 
316 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 475 (arguing that “[i]f entrepreneurs in Korea are protected 
from losing their jobs so long as they do not spend more than three years experimenting with their 
innovations, many incompetent entrepreneurs may find it tempting to enter into the venture capital 
market in Korea”) .  
As for this situation, a venture capital expert argues that “if venture entrepreneurs don’t have the 
confidence to grow their companies, they shouldn’t start venture business in the first place.”  Venture 
Moral Hazards (1), supra note 18. 
As well as helping incompetent venture capital-backed companies start their businesses, the 
government’s direct supports “artificially prolong the life of nonviable companies.”  Ko, infra note 345.  
In this sense, the Korean government patronizes venture businesses from cradle to grave.  See supra 
note 309 and accompanying text. 
317 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1100.  
Gresham’s law means “[t]he principle that inferior products or practices tend to displace superior 
ones.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 204 (Abrid. 7th ed. 2000). 
Cf. Myoung Ho Lee & Hoon Huh, A SD approach to the evaluation of Internet Venture Business: 
Focusing on effect of government support system and incubating system, at 8-9 (2002) (arguing that 
“government funding support policies do not take on a primary role in facilitating the performance of 
venture businesses in the long run”), available at http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2002/ 
papers/Lee1.pdf.  
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by VCs.318   
As for the combination of explicit and implicit contracts and the braiding of 
the VC-investor relationship and the VC fund-venture business relationship, the 
government’s policy focus on the direct support of venture businesses has given 
rise to a failure in the establishment of infrastructure for the implicit contract 
mechanisms.  As venture businesses are by nature dependent on ecosystem to 
supply capital, management and marketing advice, and other environmental 
supports, the government’s financial supports alone cannot effectively promote the 
whole venture capital ecosystem.  The Korean government has neglected to 
provide infrastructures for financial intermediaries, reputation market, and well-
balanced IPO markets.319  Those are essential for the implicit contract mechanisms 
and the efficient braiding of the dual contractual relationships.320 
VCs link the dual contractual relationships, the VC-investor relationship and 
the VC fund-venture business relationship, by serving as financial 
intermediaries. 321   The government’s venture promotion policy interrupts the 
spontaneous development of VCs’ role “by having the government . . . act as the 
financial intermediary.”322  The dual contractual structure consisting of the VC-
investor relationship and the VC fund-venture business relationship enhances the 
efficiency of a venture capital contract by reducing the risks associated with 
venture investment.323   The government’s active interference with the venture 
capital market prevents market players from efficiently forming dual contractual 
relationships.  Also, the government’s direct support makes the market actors 
opportunistic players, 324  not continuing players; therefore, it impedes the 
establishment of reputation market.325   
More importantly, the government-driven policy for the promotion of 
venture businesses has resulted in unbalanced exit markets.  The Korean 
government has attached importance only to the KOSDAQ market as an exit 
market to grow rapidly the venture industry.326  Since the KOSDAQ market was 
created in 1996, the market has served as an infrastructure for the governmental 
                                                          
318 Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 475. 
319 In Korea, the stock markets, as IPO markets, include Korean Stock Market (KSM), KOSDAQ 
market, and Free Board.  The KSM “is the market for the big and superior firms’ shares, and the 
KOSDAQ for small-to-medium enterprises and venture firms, while the shares not listed but designated 
by the KSDA are traded on the Free Board.”  The Stock Markets "Overview" section of Korea 
Securities Dealers Association (KSDA), http://www.ksda.or.kr/english/invest/stock_overview.cfm (last 
visited June 8, 2008). 
320 See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 245 (arguing that the implicit contract mechanism is based 
on the “availability of exit through an IPO”); Gilson, supra note 7, at 1091 (arguing that the 
mechanisms of the reputation market and the investment exit create the braiding of the two contractual 
relationships). 
321 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating that “VCs serve as intermediaries between 
venture businesses and outside investors to balance both parties’ interests”). 
322 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1070. 
323 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
324 See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
325 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
326 Shin, supra note 15, at 18 (stating that “the Korean government drove the development of the 
KOSDAQ market because it desired faster growth when development of financial institutions lagged”). 
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policy to encourage venture businesses.327  The Korean government promoted the 
KOSDAQ market in various ways such as providing a monopolistic status to the 
KOSDAQ market, 328  easing listing standards, and giving tax benefits. 329  
Consequently, the KOSDAQ market has grown as one of the world’s largest 
markets for high-tech venture enterprises in terms of trading volume 330  and 
aggregate value of listed stocks.331  However, other exit markets such as the M&A 
market332  and, Free Board,333  an OTC334  market, are left underdeveloped and 
                                                          
327 Cf. S. Korea Unveils Measures to Revive Venture Sector, ASIA PULSE, Dec. 24, 2004 (reporting 
that “[t]he South Korean government will give venture firms tax breaks and ramp up efforts to stimulate 
the minor bourse in a bid to foster a second venture boom”) (emphasis changed). 
328 The pseudo-stock trading facilities other than KSM, KOSDAQ, and the derivatives exchange 
have not been legislatively allowed in Korea.  See Kyong-shik Eom, Enhancing Korea’s Power in 
Global Markets, THE KOREA HERALD, May 22, 2008. 
 Article 386 of Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act provides as 
follows:        
(1) Trading markets for financial investment products established by the 
Exchange shall be as follows: 
1. The securities market; 
2. The KOSDAQ; and 
3. The derivatives market. 
(2) Any person other than the Exchange shall not establish the markets under 
paragraph (1) or any other similar facility and shall not trade securities or 
exchange-traded derivatives through any other similar facility. 
Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act § 386 (Act No.8635, 2007), available at 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/jb/jb0601/list.jsp?menu=010101&bbsid=BBS0082. 
329 See KSDA, supra note 15, at 59. 
330 Gwang-lip Moon, KRX Chief Has Big Plans for KOSDAQ: First Step Is to Make It Easier and 
Cheaper for Firms to List There, JOONGANG DAILY (English Edition), March 25, 2008 (reporting that 
“daily trade volume on the Kosdaq was 650 million shares worth 2.6 trillion won ($2.6 billion) as of 
September 2007, second to the U.S. Nasdaq”) available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/ 
view.asp?aid=2887807. 
331 The world-wide ranking of stock markets for venture capital-backed companies in terms of 
aggregate value of listed stocks is as follows: 
                                                    (A Hundred Million Dollar, %) 
 Ranking As of End of 2005 As of End of 2004 
NASDAQ (U.S.) 1 36,039.8 (2.0) 35,329.1
JASDAQ (Japan) 2 1,639.2 (35.9) 1,205.8
AIM (UK) 3 972.0 (59.5) 609.6
KOSDAQ (Korea) 4 701.4 (133.1) 300.9
Mothers (Japan) 5 593.4 (88.5) 314.9
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are growth rates compared with last year  
Source: WFE (World Federation of Exchanges) DB 
This table is a translated version of a table contained in Jong Nyun Kim et al., “䆪㓺┻ 10⎚, 
䣢ἶ㢖 ὒ㩲” [The Ten Years of KOSDAQ: Review and Problems], SAMSUNG ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, p. 5, available at http://www.seri.org/db/dbReptV.html?menu=db02&pubkey=db2006062 
8001. 
332 In Korea, M&As account for only one-digit percent of the total investment exit cases, while 
M&As are an overwhelming majority of the exit cases in the U.S. 
The following figure shows the comparison between Korean and U.S. M&A exit markets: 
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Dosoung Choi, Presentation at OECD/ADBI 7th Round Table on Capital Market Reform in Asia 
Venture Capital and Private Equity in Korea, at 19 (Oct. 27-28, 2005) (Source of the US Exit Chart: 
NVCA Yearbook (2005)), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/5/35531841.pdf. 
333  As a governmental policy, Free Board, formally called “Third Market,” has been opened to help 
venture capital-backed companies’ financing.  Free Board is the only officially organized non-
KOSDAQ OTC market “for companies listed, neither on the Stock Market Division nor on the 
KOSDAQ Market Division of KRX.”  Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA), 
http://www.ksda.or.kr/english/invest/otc_overview.cfm (last visited June 8, 2008).  For detailed 
provisions on over-the-counter transactions, see Enforcement Decree of KSEA § 84-27 (2008). “Sale 
and purchase transactions of securities outside the securities market and the KOSDAQ, method of their 
settlement and other necessary matters shall be determined by the Presidential Decree.”  KSEA § 
194(1) (2008); see also So-young Kim, New Market Formed for Venture Firms: Freeboard Replaces 
Third Market, THE KOREA HERALD, July 14, 2005 (Hwang Kun-ho, president of the Korea Securities 
Dealers Association which operates Free Board said, “[o]ut of more than 8,500 venture firms, only 376 
companies, or 4 percent, are listed on the Kosdaq. Freeboard could therefore emerge as a new 
alternative market of venture companies”); KSDA, supra note 15, at 124 (stating that “[t]he name, 
‘FreeBoard,’ signifies the KSDA’s ambition to nurture it as a market where stocks are freely traded 
under minimum regulations and at low cost”) (emphasis changed). 
The number of registered companies and the trading volume and value on Free Board have been 
in a downward trend. See Jung Han Koo, “䝚Ⰲ⽊✲G䢲㎇䢪Gὒ㩲” [Tasks for the Activation of Free 
Board], Weekly Financial Briefs16 KOREAN INST. OF FIN. NO. 38.1, 12-13.1 (2007), available at 
http://www.kif.re.kr/KMFileDir/128354894275000000_16-38-f2.PDF. 
The following table shows the trade comparison among three stock markets in Korea:  
 KSM KOSDAQ Free Board 
Monthly Trading Volume 
(Sum of Feb. / March of 2008) 
5,768 / 6,077 9,031 / 9,815 1.94 / 3.75 
Monthly Trading Value 
(Sum of Feb. / March of 2008) 
84,383,559 / 
101,181,797 
25,591,142 / 
27,219,723 
2,619 / 7,008 
Unit: Million Won, Million Shares 
The table is created based on each market’s official statistics.  For the data, see FREE BOARD, 
http://www.freeboard.or.kr (last visited June 8, 2008); KRX, http://www.krx.co.kr (last visited June 8, 
2008). 
The following table of the statistics for trading on Free Board shows that the market is becoming 
stagnant. 
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inactive.335  The excessively limited exit opportunities in M&A and OTC markets 
drive many small venture enterprises that cannot satisfy the listing standards of the 
KOSDAQ market to seek a regulation-evading technique for the KOSDAQ listing, 
such as backdoor listing on the KOSDAQ market. 336   In addition, the 
government’s KOSDAQ-centered one-size-fits-all exit market policy337 caused a 
situation dominated by Gresham’s law and made competent and qualified 
companies on the KOSDAQ market move up to the Korean Stock Market.338  
There have been many market anomalies and illegal or unfair stock trading 
practices such as securities fraud and market manipulation in the KOSDAQ 
market,339 which undermines the market’s quality and investor confidence.340 
                                                          
 
Source: Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA) 
KSDA, supra note 15, at 127.  “The Board enjoyed its peak in late 2002, with 183 listed issues at 
the end of the year.  As the IT bubble burst and liquidity dried up, the number of listed issues had fallen 
to 56 as of year-end 2006.”  Id. 
334 Over-The-Counter (“OTC”) is defined as a “security traded in some context other than on a 
formal exchange such as the NYSE, TSX, AMEX, [NASDAQ], etc.  The phrase over-the-counter can 
be used to refer to stocks that trade via a dealer network as opposed to on a centralized exchange.”  
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/otc.asp (emphasis changed) (last visited June 8, 
2008). 
335 In this sense, the Korean “government venture policy face[s] the significant level of bottlenecks 
due to insufficient exit market in bringing successful implementation.”  Youngseok Yang & Hoyoung 
Hwang, “㌂䣢G㡆ἆⰳG㧊⪶OzG uG{ P㦚G㧊㣿䞲G㔲㧻㭧㕂G⻺㻮㥷㎇㔲㓺䎲㦮G
㰚䢪☚G⹥G䌖╏㎇G⿚㍳G୉G⻺㻮㧦⁞㑲䢮G㡆ἆⰳG⿚㍳㦚G㭧㕂㦒⪲” [Evolutionary and Validity 
Analysis of Korean New Venture Promotion Policy by Utilizing Social Network Theory - In the center 
of Venture Financing Circular Network], 7 KOREAN ASSOC’N OF APPLIED ECON. 214 (2005), available 
at http://www.kaae.or.kr/images/7-1/719_yys.pdf. 
336 See Ja-young Yoon, ‘Momentum’ Stocks Underperform, THE KOREA HERALD, Dec. 26, 2006 
(reporting that “[a] series of entertainment firms, which do not satisfy the standards for a new listing, 
chose backdoor listings as a shortcut to get on the bourse”). 
337 In the current one-size-fits-all exit market system in Korea, the KOSDAQ market face a 
dilemma in keeping the proper level of the listing standards: if the listing standards are low, many 
problems such as market manipulation, stock price bubble, and moral hazards will prevail on the 
KOSDAQ and ultimately undermine investor confidence and market integrity; while, on the other hand, 
if the listing standards are high, investors on small-cap venture enterprises will lose opportunities for 
exiting investment on the KOSDAQ. 
338 See Hyong-ki Park, KOSDAQ Firms Eye Listing on KOSPI, THE KOREA HERALD, Feb. 28, 2008 
(reporting that “[a] number of large-cap companies listed on the tech-heavy Kosdaq market are taking a 
U-turn and heading toward the benchmark KOSPI market, citing that it is better to list on the main 
bourse due to its stability and image”).  In this context, the KOSPI market means the KSM. 
339 S Korea’s KOSDAQ Market, supra note 271 (reporting that the KOSDAQ “market has been 
marked by frequent fluctuations and other unwelcome events, such as embezzlement and stock price 
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR KOREAN POLICIES TO PROMOTE VENTURE BUSINESSES 
The fundamental problem of the Korean venture promotion policy is the 
discrepancy between the policy goal and the policy measures.  The policy goal and 
the measures should be matched in a market-friendly way.  In promoting venture 
businesses, a market-based policy is more efficient than a planned economic 
policy.  As shown in the U.S. venture capital market model, the private ordering 
among market players is the secret of success of the U.S. venture capital industry. 
The planned economic policy for promoting venture businesses, under which 
the government serves as both capital provider and financial intermediary, cannot 
efficiently reduce the risks341 associated with venture capital investment and rather 
distorts the incentive and monitoring mechanisms.342  As the venture business is an 
innovative and risky business, the investment in the business requires special 
expertise and experience to appreciate the commercial value of innovation and 
manage the business risk.343  In addition, as a venture business is usually a start-up 
without business experience, specialized investors are demanded to give it 
management support.344  The “innovative,” “risky,” and “immature” characteristics 
of a venture business require venture investors to be willing and able to provide 
management assistance and business monitoring as well as capital.  The public 
officers do not have capacity to choose competent start-ups and to assist and 
monitor the selected companies.345  They cannot efficiently engineer the venture 
capital market system because the system is too complex to be controlled by a 
centralized authority.346  In addition, they do not have the right incentives347 but 
                                                          
manipulations”). 
340 See Miki Tanikawa, Small-Cap, Big Problems; Investors Shun South Korea’s Tech-Heavy 2nd 
Market, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD-TRIBUNE, Aug. 26, 2004 (reporting a securities expert’s 
statement that, in the KOSDAQ market, “[i]nvestor sentiment has collapsed because so many 
companies have deceived so many investors”). 
341 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1070. 
342 See Gulinello, supra note 13, at 860. 
343 Also, the expertise and experience are required “for market participants to police one another 
and detect uncooperative behavior.”  Paredes, supra note 231, at 1115. 
344 With [his or her] experience, the venture capitalist can assist a management-thin 
early-stage company in locating and recruiting the management and technical 
personnel it needs as its business grows, and can help the company through the 
predictable problems that high-technology firms face in moving from prototype 
development to production, marketing, and distribution. The venture capital 
fund’s industry knowledge and experience with prior startup firms helps it locate 
managers for new startups. 
Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 252-53.  
345 See Kyoung-tae Ko, [SME FINANCE(2)] Seoul Selective in Financing Small Companies: State 
Support Focuses on Innovative Firms, But Experts Still Doubt Effectiveness, THE KOREA HERALD, Oct. 
26, 2006 (reporting an interview with an engineer who states that government officers “didn’t know 
anything about technology and business”). 
346 The more grows the Korean venture capital industry, the harder becomes the promotion and 
regulation on the industry. Cf. Noland, supra note 244 (stating that “[t]he main ongoing concern in 
South Korea is . . . the lending culture of South Korean financial sector firms and the capacity of South 
Korean authorities to successfully regulate the more complex financial system enabled by 
liberalization”). 
347 Cf. The government’s purpose of venture business funding is different from VCs’ funding as 
follows: 
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rather cause moral hazard problems.348  Therefore, the government can neither 
substitute for “a specialized financial intermediary”349 nor efficiently design the 
contractual structure of the venture capital investment.   
The Korean government must change the policy approach to the 
development of the venture industry: from the direct involvement in the market to 
the market-based infrastructural support.  Professor Gilson’s “simultaneity” theory 
suggests the details of the government’s role in promoting the venture capital 
ecosystem.  Professor Gilson emphasizes the government’s role in settling “the 
simultaneity problem when market forces are not likely to do so.”350  A venture 
capital market consists of venture entrepreneurs, venture investors as capital 
providers, and VCs as sophisticated financial intermediaries who link the 
entrepreneurs and investors through the mechanism of a dual contractual 
structure.351  Professor Gilson argues that if the government provides the venture 
capital market with seed money and nurtures sophisticated financial intermediaries, 
more venture entrepreneurs will come out in the market.352  A note of caution is 
that the government should invest public funds in venture capital funds,353 not 
directly in venture businesses, and let the fund managers select and monitor 
portfolio companies without governmental influence.354  The government should 
not interfere with prescreening by financial intermediaries and the incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms among market participants.355  In addition to nurturing 
financial intermediaries, the government must establish the infrastructure for 
efficient private ordering by the intermediaries.  The infrastructure must include 
reputation and exit markets, which support the incentive and monitoring 
mechanisms created by the explicit and implicit contracts.356  The implication of 
the “implicit contract” and “simultaneity” theories for the Korean venture policy is 
that 1) the government must abolish the venture business certification system357 
                                                          
The government sought only the success of the technology and its use in 
research.  But capital market intermediaries had not only the obligation to 
develop the technology and its applications successfully, but the additional 
substantial obligation to do this in a way which promised to bring private 
investors a return on their investments in firms which brought innovations to the 
market. That is, an innovation backed by capital market institutions has not only 
to be useful but profitable. 
D. QUINN MILLS, BUY LIE, AND SELL HIGH; HOW INVESTORS LOST OUT ON ENRON AND THE INTERNET 
BUBBLE 13 (2002).  
348 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 474 (contending that “too much power in the hands of a few 
government officials may . . . breed corruption”).  
349 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1070. 
350 Gulinello, supra note 13, at 846 (citing Gilson, supra note 7, at 1099-1101). 
351 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1093. 
352 Id. at 1094. 
353 Public funds are required only “to ‘jump start’ private equity markets.”  John Armour & Douglas 
Cumming, The Legal Road To Replicating Silicon Valley 38 (ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 281, 2004), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/ 
WP281.pdf. 
354 Otherwise, “the public money may actually ‘crowd out’ investment from the private sector.”  Id. 
at 9. 
355 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1099. 
356 See id. at 1091-92. 
357 Lim et al., supra note 262, at 275. 
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and 2) the government should concentrate on establishing infrastructures358 for an 
efficient venture capital ecosystem, which creates efficient incentive and 
monitoring mechanisms and a virtuous cycle of venture capital. 
The Korean government certifies venture businesses with statutory definition 
and administrative discretion359 and provides excessive supports to the certified 
start-up companies.360  As the venture capital promotion programs of Israel, Chile, 
and Taiwan suggest, 361  the government’s policy should neither influence 
investment decisions of market participants nor distort their incentive and 
monitoring structure.362   However, the venture business certification system in 
Korea prevents market participants from being incentivized and behaving 
according to a reasonable B/C analysis.  The costs of the venture business 
certification system are very high because it causes venture entrepreneurs to 
behave in accordance with the public policy goal, not with the economic B/C 
analysis, even from the stage of business planning and organization.363  Once a 
start-up is certified as a venture business, the company receives various kinds of 
preferential treatments such as public funding, credit guarantee, and other 
investment support.  Those benefits for the certified venture business result in 
weakening venture businesses’ “self-regenerating ability” 364  and increasing 
monitoring and screening costs incurred by financial intermediaries. 365   The 
venture business certification system is an obstacle to the Korean government’s 
new policy goal of reinforcing “the functions of the infrastructure and the capital 
market.” 366   Therefore, the venture business certification system and similar 
government programs367 should be abrogated. 
                                                          
358 The infrastructures necessarily include balanced IPO markets.  See infra note 369 and 
accompanying text. 
359 For an explanation of the dilemma between statutory definition and administrative discretion, 
see supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
360 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
361 For examples of the Israeli Yozma program and the Chilean CORFU program, see Gilson, supra 
note 7, at 1097-99.  For the venture promotion case of Taiwan, see Gulinello, supra note 13. 
362 In this sense, the venture business certification system infringes the “requirement of allocative 
passivity, [which] is central to carving out an effective governmental role in engineering a venture 
capital market.”  Gilson, supra note 7, at 1100. 
363 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 472. 
364 Editorial, Classic Venture Capital, THE KOREA HERALD, June 10, 2005. 
365 See supra note 318, and accompanying text.     
366 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.     
367 It is problematic that the governmental supports of the programs for venture businesses and 
SMEs are in many respects overlapping. As well as the venture certification program, there are other 
similar venture business promotion programs in Korea, such as the INNOBIZ certification program.  
See INNOBIZ, http://www.innobiz.or.kr/english/main.asp (last visited June 8, 2008). The INNOBIZ 
certification system is legally based on Technology Innovation Promotion Act for Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises § 15 (2007).  Excessive governmental influence on the venture capital market sector 
by overlapping venture promotion programs damages the efficiency of private ordering and results in 
inefficient distribution of administrative and economic resources.  The government should effectively 
concentrate the governmental resources and efforts for the promotion of venture businesses by unifying 
the distracted venture promotion programs.  As for the allocation of the governmental resources and 
efforts, if the government concludes that a sector of a venture industry should be encouraged, it can 
intensively promote the sector.  Before executing the promotion policy, however, the government must 
evaluate the policy’s influence on the private sector to check if the governmental intervention distorts 
the venture capital contract mechanisms.  Then, the government can promote the specific sector of a 
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The Korean government should concentrate on building infrastructures for 
the efficient venture capital market such as the following: fostering competent 
VCs, which have capability and incentive to filter off incompetent firms and 
develop promising venture enterprises; 368  building a venture business-friendly 
legal environment to increase venture capital funding;369 and establishing active 
and balanced IPO markets370 to facilitate the virtuous venture capital cycle.371  
Currently, the government is supporting training programs for VCs to foster 
competent financial intermediaries. 372   In connection with nurturing VCs, the 
government should not interfere with VCs’ intermediary activities in the venture 
capital market, bearing in mind its role for “passive investment in a highly 
incentivized intermediary.”373  As for legal infrastructure for the venture capital 
market, the newly legislated “Financial Investment Services and Capital Market 
Act” 374  is intended to improve the legal environment for the venture capital 
market.  The act is expected to facilitate private equity investment375 and to grow 
the capital market sector in Korea.376  Also, the enhanced investor protection under 
                                                          
venture industry considering the characteristics of the business or industry sector.   
One of the main problems concerning the government’s direct support is the uniformity.  Some 
experts in Korea point out the “weakness in the development of various policies depending on 
characteristics of each venture business and each industry sector.”  Lim et al., supra note 262, at 12 
(translated from Korean to English).  They argue as follows: 
The current policy for promoting venture businesses lays disproportionate 
emphasis on function-based supports such as supports for capital, technology 
development and human resources and thus fails to meet the various demands 
depending on the growth stage of venture businesses. 
Venture businesses require different management resources according to their 
growth stage.  Accordingly, in order to support venture businesses efficiently, the 
governmental policy should consider the growth stage and the characteristic of 
the industry sector where a venture business belongs. 
Id. (translated from Korean to English). 
368 Sung-hoon Cho, Efficient Markets Vital to Venture Firm Growth, THE KOREA HEARLD, June 12, 
2008 (arguing that “it is necessary to enhance venture capitalists’ skills to assess the value of a 
technology or a business model in order to promote investments in early-stage venture businesses”). 
369 See Armour & Cumming, supra note 353, at 37 (arguing that “[f]avourable tax and legal 
environments facilitate the establishment of venture capital and private equity funds and increase the 
supply of capital”). 
370 See Ko & Shin, supra note 25, at 477 (arguing that “priority must be granted to continue efforts 
in developing a sound financial infrastructure [in Korea], including the development of a well-
functioning stock market”). 
371 In addition, if necessary, the government as an infrastructure provider has to provide 
environmental supports such as an “educated workforce,” “funding for basic and translational 
research,” “strong patent laws,” “proactive technology transfer,” and “a science-based regulatory 
environment.”  Wyse, supra note 2, at 1285-87. 
372 See Small and Medium Business Administration, supra note 12, at 18. 
373 Gilson, supra note 7, at 1102. 
374 Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act § 386 (2007). 
375 See Jung-youn Park, Capital Market Set to Undergo Sweeping Changes, THE KOREA HERALD, 
May 29, 2007 (reporting an interview with Dr. Hyoung-tae Kim stating that “under the new capital 
market act, we expect private equity funds to take the role of principal sponsors of investment”). 
376 See generally Dong-hwan Kim, Capital Market Act to Overhaul Financial Sector, THE KOREA 
HERALD, June 2, 2008; Capital Market Act to Boost Securities Sector, THE KOREA HERALD, June 13, 
2007. 
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the act377 would increase the investor confidence and therefore “expand[] the scope 
of capital markets.”378 
However, the infrastructure for exiting investment is underdeveloped in 
Korea.  The activation of Free Board or a junior stock exchange for small and 
micro-cap venture enterprises is required for investment exit and public financing 
for small venture enterprises.  A non-KOSDAQ lower-level stock market, Free 
Board, has long been depressed and the prospects of the market are gloomy.  Now 
that there is no junior market to the KOSDAQ, Free Board is important as both a 
pre-KOSDAQ OTC market and an exit market for small-sized venture 
enterprises.379  There are some clear reasons why Free Board is depressed and 
short of liquidity.  The trading method of Free Board is a negotiated trading not a 
competitive auction trading and the capital gain tax is not as broadly exempted in 
Free Board as in the KOSDAQ market. 380   Therefore, it takes much more 
transactional efforts and costs to trade on Free Board than on the KOSDAQ.  To 
revitalize Free Board, the government should lower the transaction costs in the 
market by reducing transaction-related taxes as favorably as in the KOSDAQ.381  
The trading method of Free Board should also be changed from negotiated trading 
to competitive auction trading.382  The favorable taxation and convenient trading 
system will induce many investors to trade on Free Board and accordingly expand 
the investor base of the market.383 
More importantly, the government must change the point of view from the 
one-size-fits-all KOSDAQ-based market system to the two-tiered IPO market 
system for hi-tech venture enterprises.384  The two-tiered IPO market system for 
                                                          
377 See Kim, supra note 376 (stating that “the act will upgrade the investor protection mechanism to 
a global standard, equipped with accountability, suitability, a know-your-customer rule, and various 
measures preventing conflict of interest”). 
378 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1131, 
1149 (1997). 
379 See Kyong Shik Eom, “䝚Ⰲ⽊✲ ⹲㩚 ⹿㞞” [A Plan for the Development of Free Board], 
Presentation at Symposium on the Promotion of Innovative SMEs and the Development of Free Board, 
Korea Securities Dealers Association, 2006, at 20-26 (arguing that Free Board should serve as an OTC 
market for “Information Platform” and “Nurturing Innovation” and a “Junior Market”), available at 
http://www.freeboard.or.kr/m04/pds_cont.jsp?cseq=174; see also Jung-youn Park, [SMI 
FINANCE(3)]Venture Capital Offers New Way to Finance SMEs :This is the Third in a Series of 
Articles on the Latest Developments in Finance Services for Small Enterprises, THE KOREA HERALD, 
Nov. 2, 2006 (reporting that “[e]xperts . . . point out that the nation’s Freeboard, or the third securities 
market for trading shares of companies that are not listed on either the Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index or Kosdaq, should become more active”). 
380 See FREE BOARD, http://www.freeboard.or.kr (last visited June 8, 2008). 
381 See Koo, supra note 333, at 13. 
382 See id. 
383 The legal obstacle to the development of Free Board’s trading system is Article 386 of Financial 
Investment Services and Capital Market Act. 
Improvement of the trading system of Free Board may violate Article 386.  In this regard, Article 
386 checks the long-term development of OTC markets in Korea.  Historically, Article 386 may have 
contributed to the rapid growth of KSM, KOSDAQ, and the derivatives exchange in Korea by 
providing a monopolistic status to those exchanges.  However, the Article deprives those exchanges of 
opportunities to develop through stock market competition.  KRX, the operator of those exchanges, is 
planning to perform an IPO.  It is desirable that Article 386 prohibiting the “pseudo-trading facilities” 
should be relaxed.  Eom, supra note 328. 
384 The combination of the two-tiered markets could be the KOSDAQ market and a junior market to 
2008 U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL THEORIES FOR KOREA 195 
 
venture businesses, consisting of the KOSDAQ market and Free Board or of the 
KOSDAQ and a junior market to the KOSDAQ, is required both to keep the 
quality of a KOSDAQ market and to satisfy the IPO demands from micro or small-
cap venture enterprises385 in Free Board or a junior market to the KOSDAQ.  As 
the implicit contract theory suggests, the availability of IPOs for a wide spectrum 
of venture enterprises incentivizes venture entrepreneurs to strive for the success of 
their businesses and it enables the stock markets to grow in quality and quantity by 
providing the markets with more competent venture enterprises.386   Then, the 
development of the stock markets will enhance the availability of IPOs for venture 
enterprises387 and give venture entrepreneurs stronger incentives for the success of 
                                                          
the KOSDAQ.  The three-tiered IPO market system, consisting of the KOSDAQ market, a junior 
market to the KOSDAQ, and Free Board, would be more ideal.  However, considering the size of the 
Korean financial market, the activation of the three-tiered IPO markets is hard to achieve. 
385 The small companies’ responses to higher disclosure requirements in a stock market are the 
results of balancing of the costs and benefits caused by the increased disclosures.  Brian J. Bushee & 
Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC 
Bulletin Board, 39 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS. 233, 240 (2005).  The fixed costs of 
complying with disclosure requirements are burdensome on the small companies.  Accordingly, as 
implied by following figure, many small companies would conclude that the total costs of disclosure 
exceed the total benefits. Then, they would find a less regulated OTC stock market.  
TB symbolizes the total benefits of registration: 
TB = y·S.  
TC represents the total costs of registration: TC 
= FC + xŘS.  
If the dollar amount of a transaction is less than 
$X, the costs exceed the benefits. Thus, registration 
requirements for the transaction are economically 
inefficient. This figure well explains economics of 
small size offering exemptions. 
Originally, this Figure was created by Prof. Bradford to explain the economics of the small 
offering exemptions.  C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An 
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L. J. 591, 617 (1996). 
386 Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 268; cf. Wyse, supra note 2, at 1287 (arguing that “[t]here is a 
common misconception that an abundance of venture capital will spawn the formation of new 
companies. In fact, the opposite is true: high-quality new companies will attract venture capital”). 
387 A recent empirical study in the U.S. implies the importance of the multi-tiered stock market 
system.  According to the study, the imposition of strengthened mandatory disclosure requirements on 
small-sized companies results in compelling them to move to a “less regulated market” rather than 
forcing them to disclose more information to investors. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 385, at 261. 
In 1999, the SEC approved the NASD’s eligibility rule for the OTC Bulletin Board market, which 
mandates all companies quoted on the OTCBB to file periodic reports under the 1934 Act.  The 
background on the rule making is as follows: “In the late 1990s, . . .the SEC noted a surge in OTCBB 
securities fraud.  The SEC then determined that it should bring small OTCBB companies, including 
those falling below the size and shareholder limits set out in the Exchange Act, under the same 
reporting standards applicable to larger public companies.”  Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market 
Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 707, 717 
(2005); see also Press Release, NASD, NASD Announces SEC Approval of OTC Bulletin Board 
Eligibility Rule (Jan. 6, 1999), (http://www.otcbb.com/news/EligibilityRule/eligrulepressrel.stm). 
Responding to the extension of mandatory disclosure requirements under the eligibility rule, a 
majority of the small-sized non-reporting companies quoted on the OTCBB moved to the less regulated 
Pink Sheets market, rather than complied with the increased disclosure requirements.  “In this regard, 
the Pink Sheets may have played an important role.”  Bushee & Leuz, supra note 385, at 261. 
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their businesses.388  To sum up, when the venture capital infrastructures including 
competent VCs, a venture business-friendly legal environment, and active IPO 
markets are satisfied, as the simultaneity theory implies,389 many qualified venture 
businesses will spontaneously appear in the Korean venture capital ecosystem.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Policy makers in Korea should keep in mind that the success of the U.S. 
venture business industry is attributed to private ordering among market players390 
and venture capital cycle based on active IPO markets.391  They should understand 
the mechanism where inputs of seed capital and financial intermediaries in the 
venture business-friendly environment make a success of some venture businesses, 
especially in the form of IPOs, 392  and the success attracts more capital and 
financial intermediaries from the private sector achieving a bigger success of 
                                                          
We can extend the implication of the study to the case of the KOSDAQ market. Suppose the 
regulatory authority strengthens the listing standards of the KOSDAQ to enhance the quality of the 
market.  As venture start-ups are usually smaller than the formally listed companies on the KOSDAQ, 
some of the companies cannot meet the strict listing standards and the other companies would judge 
that the total costs of disclosure compliance are greater than the overall benefits.  Accordingly, the 
small venture enterprises would be likely to move to the less regulated OTC market, Free Board, rather 
than to comply with the reinforced listing requirements.  See id. at 235 (arguing that “an important 
consequence of mandatory SEC disclosures is to push smaller firms with lower outside financing needs 
into a less regulated market, rather than to compel them to adopt higher disclosure standards”). 
388  Consequently, active IPO markets support virtuous cycles in both corporate and financial 
sectors.  The virtuous cycle in the corporate sector, as mentioned above, is created by the availability of 
IPOs, which incentivizes venture entrepreneurs to strive for the success of their businesses.  Regarding 
the financial sector, as the venture capital cycle theory suggests, active exit markets serve as an 
infrastructure for venture capital investors to realize satisfactory investment returns and the successful 
exits help VCs raise successor funds by attracting potential venture investors with track records. 
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 40, at 345.  For an example, see Gilson, supra note 7, at 1101 (stating 
that “[s]uccessful performance by early KKR funds attracted much more private investment into the 
private equity market, led to the creation of many more funds, and generally fueled the private equity 
market’s restructuring of U.S. industry”) (citing GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE 
NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE 
VALUE 79-80 (1998)). 
The virtuous cycles in both financial and corporate sectors make market players act as continuing 
players: VCs keep on raising successor funds for new venture investment and venture entrepreneurs 
continue managing their enterprises as VCs come to return their corporate control after the event of 
investment exit.  See Black & Gilson, supra note 6, at 243 (stating that venture entrepreneurs “reacquire 
control from the venture capitalist by using an initial public offering as the means by which the venture 
capitalist exits from a portfolio investment”). 
The repeat playing of market participants is one of the essential requirements for private ordering 
and reputation market.  See supra notes 140 and 232.  The reputational sanction enforces implicit 
contracts among venture capital market players. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1086 and 1090.  
389 See Gilson, supra note 7, at 1094. 
390 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.  
391 As the venture capital theory and the success of the U.S. venture capital industry imply, private 
equity financing is more efficient type of financing for small and medium-sized venture enterprises than 
debt financing.  Let alone the efficiency argument, the stern reality is that banks, which are usually risk 
averse, are not willing to provide financing to venture businesses for lack of their track records and 
assets for collateral.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
392 See Oehler, supra note 59, at 492 (arguing that “[i]f history is any guide, the majority of [sic] 
venture capitalists’ investments will ultimately prove unsuccessful, but the benefits of even a single 
successful IPO will usually more than make up for the losses incurred through failed investments”). 
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venture businesses; 393  which creates virtuous cycles in the both finance and 
corporate sectors of venture business industry.  To make the virtuous cycles, the 
Korean government must abolish the venture certification system and adopt capital 
market-friendly venture policies.  Also, the government should shift the policy 
emphasis from the expansion of the KOSDAQ for boosting the venture industry394 
to the balanced development of each exit market to support the spontaneous 
growth of the venture ecosystem. 
 
                                                          
393 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
394 The current trend of regulating listing rules of the KOSDAQ market is to ease the listing 
standards and reinforce the delisting standards.  See Hyong-ki Park, Regulators to Make Listing Easier 
Next Year, THE KOREA HERALD, Nov. 14, 2007; Moon, supra note 330.  This policy may be efficient 
for expanding the stock market and boosting the venture industry in a short time.  However, the policy 
poses a risk that the stock market may turn into a lemon market by operation of Gresham’s law.  
Consequently, small and individual investors may suffer the side effects of this type of economic 
development by innovation.  If the KOSDAQ listing standards become more relaxed, more individual 
investors will fall victims to underperforming or delisting companies.  The KOSDAQ market should 
keep the proper listing standard level to maintain investor protection and market quality. 
